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VOLUME 27 JANUARY, 1943 NUMBER 2
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABLE
QUALITY
By WILLIAM L. PROSSER*
S THERE such a thing as a standard warranty of quality pre-
sumptively to be implied in every sale of goods made by a
dealer? Otherwise stated, are there certain minimum requirements
of quality in the thing sold which every purchaser from such a
dealer is entitled to demand unless there is express agreement to
the contrary, or circumstances are shown which indicate a con-
trary understanding?
Section 15 (2) of the Uniform Sales Act' reads as follows:
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller
who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower
or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be of merchantable quality.
This section, which has been enacted thus far in thirty-four
states, as well as the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii,'
was copied almost verbatim from the first part of Section 14 (2)
of the English Sale of Goods Act' of 1894, which was itself a
restatement and codification of the common law of England as
it existed at that date.4 As it is stated in the American act, the
section undoubtedly represents the more prevalent, and certainly
"Minnesota State Counsel, Office of Price Administration. Nothing in
this article is to be understood as representing the views of the Office of Price
Administration, or of any person other than the author.
12 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec 8390 (2).
"1 Uniform Laws Annotated, 1941 Supplement, p. 6.
'56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71, see. 14 (2) : "Where goods are bought by
description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whetherlie be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods
shall be of merchantable quality; provided that if the buyer has examined
the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards defects which
such examination ought to have revealed."
'Chalmers, Sale of Goods Act (8th ed. 1920), 42-47.
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the better, holdings of our courts at common law. 5 Along with
the rest of the Uniform Sales Act, it is of persuasive authority in
states where the Act has not yet been adopted,' and it has been
recognized as merely declaratory of established common law rules.1
If our standard warranty exists, it must be found in this section
and the construction which has been placed upon it. Taking into
account not only the decisions which have interpreted the sec-
tion itself, but also those at common law which preceded it and
those which have dealt with related questions, it is perhaps not
surprising to find that there are nearly a thousand cases which
bear upon the problem. The current draft of the proposed Re-
vision of the Uniform Sales Act,8 to conform to the proposed
Federal Sales Act, has made important changes in the wording
of the section-which, however, as will be seen, add little or
nothing to the meaning which it is now given by the courts.
It may therefore be of interest to review the existing state of
the law with reference to the implied warranty of merchantable
quality, when it arises, and what it means.
HISTORY
In its inception, breach of warranty was a tort. The action
was upon the case, for breach of an assumed duty, and the wrong
was conceived to be a form of misrepresentation, in the nature
of deceit and not at all clearly distinguished from deceit. Even
-Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924), ch. IX.
6The Sales Act, as of 1941, had not yet been adopted in the following
states: Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West
Virginia.
McNabb v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., (1938) 272 Ky. 112,
113 S. W. (2d) 470; Hoback v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, (1936) 20
Tenn. App. 280, 98 S. W. (2d) 113; Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler,
(1938) 173 Md. 490, 197 Atl. 105.
sProposed Report on and Draft of a Revised Uniform Sales Act for
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, considered by
the Conference at its Indianapolis meeting, September, 1941. At the time
of writing, the Report and Second Draft published by the Conference,
embodying the results of the Indianapolis discussion, has just come to hand.
Section 15 (2) of this Draft reads as follows: "Where there is a contract
to sell or a sale by a seller who [regularly] deals in goods of the kind or
description concerned, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable goods of that kind or description, i.e.. of at least fair [average]
quality, and such as by mercantile usage pass without objection in the mar-
ket under the designation in the contract, and that they shall be reasonably
fit for the ordinary and usual purposes for which such goods are used. A
manufacturer who sells his product 'deals' therein, within the meaning of
this Act." (The words enclosed in brackets are thus enclosed in the draft,
and are subject to possible elimination.)9Ames, History of Assumpsit, (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8; 1 Willis-
ton, Sales (2d ed. 1924), 368-369.
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after Lord Holt's decisions made it clear that the action would
lie for a mere affirmation of fact by the seller even though he
made it innocently and without any knowledge of its falsity,10 the
action was still in tort; and as late as 1797 we find Lord Kenyon
talking of breach of warranty as a form of "fraud."'" Warranty
has never entirely lost this tort character which it had in the
beginning; and this may have important consequences at the pres:
ent day. For one thing, it is generally agreed that a tort form
of action, as on the case, may still be maintained for the breach,
without any proof of either intentional misrepresentation or even
negligence.'12 In addition, the tort element involved may permit
damages not recoverable for mere breach of contract, such as
wrongful death,"- or the application of a different statute of
limitations ;14 and it has served as a strong argumeht for those
who seek to extend implied warranties of quality from the pro-
ducer to the ultimate consumer, in the absence of any "privity"
of contract between the two.'G Furthermore, it has continued to
color the substantive law of warranty itself, by introducing some
idea of misrepresentation of fact, however innocent, and of re-
liance on the part of the buyer upon the seller's knowledge, skill
or judgnent, or some implied assertion concerning the char-
acter of the goods sold.
Shortly after 1750, an express warranty began to be recog,
nized as a term of the contract of sale, and attorneys adopted the
practice of declaring on the contract. In Stuart v. Wilkins,' in
"0Cross v. Gardner, (1689) 1 Show. 68, Carthew 90, 3 Mod. Rep. 261;
Medina v. Stoughton, (1700) 1 Ld. Raym. 593, 1 Salk. 210. Accord, Wil-
liamson v. Allison, (1802) 2 East 446.
"Jendwine v. Slade, (1797) 2 Esp. 572.
"2Shippen v. Bowen, (1887) 122 U. S. 575, 7 Sup. Ct. 1283, 30 L. Ed.
1172; Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co., (1919) 213 Ill. App. 371;
Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., (1908) 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 481, 15
L. R. A. (N. S.) 884, 126 Am. St. Rep. 436, 15 Ann. Cas. 1076; Standard
Paint Co. v. Victor & Co., (1917) 120 Va. 595, 91 S. E. 752.
13Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co. (1938) 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. (2d) 557,
115 A. L. R. 1020. Contra, Howson v. Foster Beef Co., (1935) 87 N. H.
200, 177 Atl. 656. Cf. Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., (1923) 205 App.
Div. 648, 200 N. Y. S. 121; Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., (1916) 93
Wash. 48, 52, 56, 160 Pac. 14; Davis v. Williams, (1938) 58 Ga. App. 274,
278, 198 S. E. 357; Challis v. Hartloff, (1933) 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d)
199.
14Schlick v. New York Dugan Bros., (1940) 175 Misc. 182, 22 N. Y. S.
(2d) 238.
" Note, (1933) 18 Corn. L. Q. 445; Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works, (1931) 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537; Challis v. Hartloff,(1933) 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d) 199; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co.,(1920) 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382, 17 A. L. R. 649; Mazetti v. Armour
& Co., (1913) 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 213, Ann.
Cas. 1915C 140.16(1778) 1 Douglas 18.
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1778, the practice was sanctioned by a decision that assumpsit
would lie for a breach of warranty if it were express. In the
course of argument with counsel there seems to have been a
lively discussion, not reported in the case,'17 as to whether this
might be true of an implied warranty also; and Lord Mansfield
was of the opinion that that at least was still exclusively a matter
of tort. Evidently the reference was to the implied warranty of
title, the only one recognized at the time. By 1810, however,
when implied warranties of quality were first established,", a
whole generation of lawyers had been taught to regard any war-
ranty as a contract, and the assumpsit action was accepted as a
matter of course.
The leading case is Gardiner v. Gray,' at nisi prius in 1815.
The buyer declared on a contract for the sale of a quantity of
"waste silk" imported from the continent. Neither buyer nor
seller had seen the goods, although samples had been forwarded
and shown by the seller to the buyer's agent. Lord Ellenborough
stated the fundamental principle of the implied warranty of
merchantable quality:
"I am of opinion, however, that under such circumstances,
the purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article answering
the description in the contract. Without any particular warranty,
this is an implied term in every such contract. Where there is
no opportunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of caveat
e~mptor does not apply. He cannot without a warranty insist that
it shall be of any particular quality or fineness, but the intention
of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable in the
market under the denomination mentioned in the contract be-
tween them. The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to
lay them on a dunghill. The question then is, whether the com-
modity purchased by the plaintiff be of such a quality as can be
reasonably brought into the market to be sold as waste silk? The
witnesses describe it as unfit for the purposes of waste silk, and
of such a quality that it cannot be sold under that denomination."
Observe that here is no mention of misrepresentation, conscious
or otherwise, or of any reliance by the buyer upon the seller's
knowledge or judgment. The ground of the decision is merely
that the seller has contracted to deliver one thing and has de-
USee the reference to this discussion in Parkinson v. Lee, (18(12) 2
East 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389.
'sHolcombe v. I-ewson, (1810) 2 Camp. 391, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194;
Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46.
19(1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46. The decision was repeated in
substance the same year, in Laing v. Fidgeon, (1815) 6 Taunt. 108, 4 Camp.
169, 128 Eng. Rep. 974.
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livered another; effect is given to the "intention of both parties"
as the contract they have made is interpreted; it is breach of
contract, pure and simple.
A long line of later cases rounded out the picture. The seller's
warranty, as a matter of contract, was held to mean not only
that the goods delivered must be genuine according to the name,
kind or description specified,20 but that they must be of a quality
to pass in the market under that description, 21 and this in turn to
mean that they must be reasonably fit for the ordinary uses to
which such goods are put.22 The warranty was recognized as a
dealer's warranty only,2 3 and trade usage must be taken into
account. "' The implied warranty of fitness for the buyer's "par-
ticular" purpose developed, and was recognized as something
separate and distinct from that of merchantable quality,26 although
the two might, and often did, overlap. Finally, in 1868, the
whole matter was summed up in Jones v. Just,26 the famous case
of the Manila hemp, which Jelf, rather over-enthusiastically,
listed as one of his "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the Law ;"27 and
the warranty of merchantable quality was stated in terms which
have passed, in substance, into the Sales Act section quoted above.
At about the same time, if not earlier,2 8 the idea began to
make its appearance that warranties arose by implication "of
law" from what had been said and done, and were independent
of any intent on the part of the seller to contract with regard to
them, or to be bound by them. This idea, now generally accepted
-"Bridge v. Wain, (1816) 1 Stark. 504, 171 Eng. Rep. 543; Nichols v.
Godts, (1854) 10 Exch. 191, 2 C. L. R. 1468, 23 L. J. Ex. 314; Allan v.
Lake, (1852) 18 Q. B. 560, 118 Eng. Rep. 212.
;-Wieler v. Schilizzi, (1856) 17 C. B. 619, 25 L. J. C. P. 89, 189 Eng.
Rep. 1219; Josling v. Kingsford, (1863) 13 C. B. (N. S.) 447, 32 L. 3.
C. P. 94, 143 Eng. Rep. 177.
:-2jones v. Bright, (1829) 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167; Beer v.
Walker, (1877) 46 L. J. Q. B. 677, 37 L. T. 278.
":,Burnby v. Bollett, (1847) 16 MN. & XV. 644, 153 Eng. Rep. 1548.
Foreshadowed by La Neuville v. Nourse, (1813) 3 Camp. 351, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1407.
-'Shepherd v. Kain (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180; Frith
v. Mitchell, (1865) 4 F. & F. 464.
:jones v. Bright, (1829) 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167; Randall
v. Newson, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 102.
*'?(1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B. 89.
-
7jelf, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the Law (2d ed. 1921), ch. XI.
;."Williston, Representation and Warranty in Sales, (1913) 27 I-arv.
L. Rev. 1, contends that this was the law from Lord Holt's time onward.
At least it became established by the dates of Stucley v. Baily, (1862)
1 H. & C. 405, and Cowdy v. Thomas, (1877) 36 L. T. (N. S.) 22.
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as to express warranties,2 9 was carried over all the more readily
into those "implied," where it became involved with the develop-
ment of modern notions of policy, based upon the increasing prac-
tice of reputable sellers to assume responsibility for defective
good sold, 0 together with the feeling that such responsibility is
best placed upon the seller as a cost of his business, which he
may distribute to the public at large as a part of the price. As
a result, it is often said that implied warranties of quality arise
by operation of law and are independent of any intention to agree
upon their terms as a matter of fact ;31 and there are many cases,
at least, in which to hold that the warranty is a term of the con-
tract is "to speak the language of pure fiction ."132
I MPLIED WARRANTY
When the ordinary lawyer, or court for that matter, says
that a warranty is "implied," what seems to be meant is merely
that it is not expressed. There has been surprisingly little dis-
cussion of just how, or why, the implication arises. Both as a
matter of history and at the present day, however, there are three
distinct theories to be discerned as the basis of implied warranties
of quality.
1. The warranty is a misrepresentation of fact. The seller has
asserted, whether expressly or by his conduct, that the goods are
of a particular kind, quality or character, and the buyer has pur-
chased in reliance upon that assertion. This is obviously a tort
theory, closely allied to the cases of deceit; and it differs from
deceit only in that it imposes strict liability for innocent misrep-
resentations, in the absence of any "scienter" in the form of knowl-
2 9Kenner v. Harding, (1877) 85 Ill. 264, 28 Am. Rep. 615; McClintock
v. Emick, Stoner & Co., (1888) 87 Ky. 160, 7 S. W. 903, 9 Ky. L. Rep.
995; Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger, (1890) 118 N. Y. 260, 23 N. E.
372, 16 Am. St. Rep. 753; Herron v. Dibrell, (1891) 87 Va. 289, 12 S. E.
674; Hobart v. Young, (1891) 63 Vt. 363, 21 Atl. 612, 12 L. R. A. 693;
Ingraham v. Union R. Co., (1896) 19 R. I. 356, 33 Att. 875.
3
oSee Bogert and Fink, Business Practices Regarding Warranties in
the Sale of Goods, (1931) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400, 415.
3lBekkevold v. Potts, (1927) 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790, 59 A. L. R.
1164; Hoe v. Sanborn, (1860) 21 N. Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163; Lee v.
Cohrt, (1930) 57 S. D. 387, 232 N. W. 900; Linn v. Radio Center Delica-
tessen, (1939) 169 Misc. 879, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 110; Little v. G. E. Van
Syckle & Co., (1898) 115 Mich. 480, 73 N. W. 554; Hooven & Allison Co.
v. Wirtz Bros., (1906) 15 N. D. 477, 107 N. W. 1078.
22Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, (1911) 24 Hary.
L. Rev. 415, 420; Smith, Surviving Fictions, (1917) 27 Yale L. J. 147, 317,
326.
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edge of their falsity or lack of belief in their truth.33 Logically,
however, it does require reasonable reliance on the part of the
buyer upon some supposed information of the seller concerning
the truth of the assertion; and if the seller does not purport to
have such information it should follow that the buyer does not
as it is stated in the Uniform Sales Act,35 apparently stands on
reasonably rely upon it, and no implied warranty is to be found.34
The implied warranty of fitness for the buyer's particular purpose,
this footing; and in many cases where the seller obviously knows
nothing about the goods, as in the case of a sale by a retailer of
beans sealed in a can,3" the courts have refused to imply a var-
ranty for lack of such reliance.
2. The warranty has in fact been agreed upon by the parties
as an unexpressed term of the contract of sale. The seller has
contracted to deliver described goods, and it is understood that
they are to have certain qualities; but that understanding has not
been embodied in the agreement. Nevertheless the court, by in-
terpreting the language used, the conduct of the parties and the
circumstances of the case, finds that it is there. Such a contract
term "implied in fact" differs from an express agreement only in
that it is circumstantially proved 7 Any difficulties arising from
'Compare the decisions in a few jurisdictions finding strict liability in
an action of deceit for innocent misrepresentation, in contracts other than
the 'ale of goods. Holcomb v. Noble, (1888) 69 'Mich. 396, 37 N. W. 497;
Schlechter v. Felton, (1916) 134 Minn. 143, 158 N. W. 813, L. R. A.
1917A 556; Tischer v. Bardin, (1923) 155 Minn. 361, 194 N. V. 3; Trust
Co. of Norfolk v. Fletcher, (1929) 152 Va. 868, 148 S. E. 785, 73 A. L. R.
1111; Jacquot v. Farmers' Straw Gas Producer Co., (1926) 140 Wash.
482, 249 Pac. 984.
:Compare, as to deceit, Tucker v. White, (1878) 125 'Mass. 344;
Krau.e v. Cook, (1906) 144 Mich. 365, 108 N. W. 81; Harris v. Delco
Products, (1940) 305 Aass. 362, 25 N. E. (2d) 740. The rule that state-
ments understood to be of opinion only are not actionable as warranties
probably rests upon the same foundation. See 'Mantle Lamp Co. v. Rucker,
(1924) 202 Ky. 777, 261 S. W. 263; Seitz v. Brewer's Refrigerating Mach.
Co. (1891) 141 U. S. 510. 12 Sup. Ct. 46, 35 L. Ed. 837; Van Horn v.
Stautz, (1921) 297 Il1. 530, 131 N. E. 153; Boston Consol. Gas Co. v.
Folsom, (1921) 237 Mass. 565, 130 N. E. 197; Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12,
2 Maon's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8387.
'-Sec. 15 (1), 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8390 (1).
!"See for example Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (W. D. Wash.
1935) 12 F. Supp. 181; Davis v. Williams, (1938) 50 Ga. App. 274, 198
S. E. 357; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Walker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 104
S. XV. (2d) 627; Walden v. Wheeler, (1913) 153 Ky. 181, 154 S. W. 1088,
44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597; Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, (1933) 165
Aliss. 71, 145 So. 726; MIcMurray v. Vaughn's Seed Store, (1927) 117
Ohio St. 236, 157 N. E. 567. A strong argument for this theory is set forth
in Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law-Making, (1936) 34 'fich.
L. Rev. 494; Vaite. Sales (1938), 223 ff.
"1L,-,mbard v. Rahilly, (1914) 127 Minn. 449, 149 N. W. 950.
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the parol evidence rule usually have been met by saying that the
description of the goods appearing in the contract is open to in-
terpretation or explanation in the light of the circumstances of
the case.
Obviously this theory is pure contract. It arose only after
warranties had been held to be enforceable in a contract action;
and the first case in which it appeared3" was one in which the
seller did not know what the goods were, and the buyer knew
that he did not know and never had seen them. It does not rest
upon any belief on the part of the buyer that the seller has
superior information, or any information at all about the goods;
and the seller's innocence or ignorance or inability to deliver
what he has contracted to deliver will no more excuse him than
in any other breach of contract. Any "reliance" of the buyer
upon the seller becomes important only in so far as it bears
upon his actual understanding of what the latter has undertaken
to deliver.
3. The warranty is imposed by the law. It is read into the con-
tract by the law without regard to whether the parties intended
it in fact; it arises merely because the goods have been sold at
all. This theory is of course one of policy. The loss due to de-
fective goods is placed upon the' seller because he is best able
to bear it and distribute it to the public, and because it is con-
sidered that the buyer is entitled to protection at the seller's ex-
pense.-" It is perhaps idle to inquire whether the basis of such a
liability is contract or tort. It partakes of the nature of both, and
in either case it is liability without fault. It is not often that "im-
plication of law" is differentiated clearly from "implied in fact;"
but the question of the policy involved is seldom absent from -war-
ranty cases, and there are a respectable number"° in which it
appears to have controlled the decision.
If it be asked which of these three theories is the basis of
the law of implied warranties in general, it can only be answered:
all three. It is seldom that it makes any difference which is
adopted; but when the occasion arises, the courts have flitted
cheerfully from one to another as the facts may demand, always
38Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46. So likewise
in Jones v. Just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B. 89
(Manila hemp sold in transit).
39A strong argument in favor of this theory appears in Brown, The
Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products, (1939) 23 'MmN-
NESOTA LAW REVIEW 585.
4oSee supra, note 31 ; infra, notes 264, 266 and text.
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tending to an increasing extent4' to favor the buyer and find the
warranty. When lack of "reliance" of the buyer upon the seller's
information becomes an obstacle, the first is abandoned in favor
of the second; when it is necessary to avoid the effect of dis-
claimers or the parol evidence rule, the second is forsaken for
the third; and when it is desired to extend the warranty to one
not in "privity of contract" with the seller, there is a return to
the first. So far as the warranty of merchantable quality is con-
cerned, however, the second theory, that of agreement "implied
in fact" and actually understood but not expressed, has pre-
dominated from the beginning; and with few exceptions, it ex-
plains the decisions.
MERCHANTABLE QUALITY
Before considering when the warranty arises, it is well to
determine what it means when it does arise. Professor Llewellyn 42
has said that there is no more puzzling question than what "mer-
chantable" means under the Sales Act. Certainly it has meant a
variety of things; but an .array of several hundred cases, reason-
ably consistent in their approach, will at least permit some general
conclusions. When a seller undertakes, expressly43 or by implica-
tion, to deliver merchantable goods, the extent of his obligation
is at least as follows:
1. Genuine according to name, kind and description. Nothing
is more elementary in all the law of contract than that an agree-
ment to deliver a horse is not satisfied by delivery of a cow.
Accordingly, it was held quite early that a contract calling for
"scarlet cuttings, ' ' 4" or "prime bacon," 5 or "Skirving's Swedes
seeds, ' ' " or for that matter a foreign bill of exchange, 47 necessarily
41
"The doctrine of implied warranty should be extended rather than
restricted." Wilson, C. J., in Bekkevold v. Potts, (1927) 173 Minn. 87, 89,
216 N. W. 790.42Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales (1930), 324.
43See for example Tye v. Fynmore, (1813) 3 Camp. 462, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1446 ("fair merchantable sassafras wood"); Raney & Hamon v.
Hamilton & White, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 234 S. W. 229 ("good and
merchantable" cattle); Kimball-Fowler Cereal Co. v. Chapman & Dewey
Lbr. Co., (1907) 125 Mo. App. 326, 102 S. V. 625 ("guaranteed" construed
to mean merchantable); Simond v. Baddon, (1857) 2 C. B. (N. S.) 324,
26 L. J. C. P. 198, 140 Eng. Rep. 441 ("fair average Nicranzi rice") ; Jones
v. Clarke, (1858) 2 H. & N. 725, 27 L. J. Ex. 165 ("fair average quality") ;
Stephens v. Brill, (1913) 159 Iowa 620, 140 N. W. 809 ("merchantable"
horse).
-'Bridge v. Wain (1816) 1 Stark. 504, 171 Eng. Rep. 543.
-'Yeats v. Pim, (1815) 2 J. J. Marsh. 141.4
'
3Allan v. Lake, (1852) 18 Q. B. 560, 118 Eng. Rep. 212.47Gompertz v. Bartlett, (1853) 2 E. & B. 849, 2 C. L. R. 395, 23 L. J.
Q. B. 65, 118 Eng. Rep. 985.
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implied an agreement, or condition or warranty, that the thing
sold should answer the name or kind described. Such a descrip-
tion is of course a matter of express language; and it has been
held frequently enough that it amounts to an express warranty
in itself.48 The earlier cases, however, treated the understanding
that the goods should conform to the description as an "inference"
or implication of fact; and both the English Sales of Goods Act'"
and the Uniform Sales Act5" contain a section, substantially identi-
cal in the two, which states the warranty as one "implied."
Whether it is to be called express or implied is ordinarily of no
importance; it appears to be both, and the courts have treated
it more or less indiscriminately as one or the other.5 1
The connection with merchantable quality arises from the fact
that when goods are bought from a dealer, the description
obviously must be construed to call for the kind of goods usually
sold by that name by such dealer, and the usages of the trade
become part of the understanding of the parties.52 It follows that
what is sold as "waste silk" must be something known to the trade
and capable of passing in the market as waste silk ;-'- a "copper-
fastened vessel" must have a sufficient amount of copper to con-
form to trade understanding of the term ;54 "oxalic acid" must be
48Power v. Barham. (1836) 4 Ad. & El. 473 (pictures by Canaletti) ;
Wolcott, Johnson & Co. v. Mount, (1873) 7 Vroom. (N. J.) 262 ("early
strap-leaf red-top turnip seed") ; Parrish v. Kotthoff, (1929) 128 Or. 529,
274 Pac. 1108; Smith v. Zimbalist, (1934) 2 Cal. App. (2d) 324, 38 P.
(2d) 170 (Stradivarius and Guarnerius violins).45Sec. 13: "Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by descrip-
tion, there is an implied condition that the goods shall correspond with the
description; and if the sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is
not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the
goods do not also correspond with the description."
5°Sec. 14, 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8389: "Where there is a
contract to sell or a sale of goods by description, there is an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall correspond with the description and if the con-
tract or sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is not sufficient that
the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also
correspond with the description."51Thus disclaimers of warranties have been avoided by findingz that the
description is expressly warranted in the same instrument. Williams v.
McClain, (1937) 180 Miss. 6, 176 So. 717; Andrews Bros. Ltd. v. Singer &
Co., Ltd., 11934] 1 K. B. 17. 103 L. J. K. B. 90, 150 L. T. 172, 50 T. L. R.
33 (disclaimer of implied warranties only). On the other hand, in Wallis
Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes, [1910] 2 K. B. 1003, [1911] A. C. 394,
a disclaimer of both express and implied warranties was avoided by finding
that the description was an implied "condition."
'-Shepherd v. Kain. (1821) 5 B. & Ald. 240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180;
Frith v. Mitchell, (1865) 4 F. & F. 464; Snowden v. WNarder, (1831) 3
Rawle (Pa.) 101; Sumner v. Tyson, (1850) 20 N. H. 384.55Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46.
'
4 Shepherd v. Kain. (1821) 5 B. & Ald. 240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180.
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the oxalic acid of commerce;5' "foreign refined rape oil"" and
"Calcutta linseed"5 7 must be pure enough to be accepted under
that name by the trade; and "Manila hemp" must not be so
wetted by sea-water that it can only be sold as defective goods. 5s
Out of a very long list of decisions implying such a warranty of
genuineness, there is space to mention only a fewi 9 ,
2. Saleable in the nmarket under the designation. Upon this
foundation of genuineness according to trade understanding was
built the second requirement, that the goods must be capable of
passing in the market under the name or description by which
they are sold. It is not enough that they be merely something
which can be called by the name; they must be of the kind or
quality commonly sold in the market."" This involves two ele-
"'Josling v. Kingsford, (1863) 13 C. B. (N. S.) 447, 32 L. J. C. P.
14, 143 Eng. Rep. 177 (adulterated with 10 per cent Epsom salts).
• I'Nichol v. Godts, (1854) 10 Exch. 191, 2 C. L. R. 1468, 23 L. J. Ex.
314 (mixture of hemp oil and rape oil).
57Wieler v. Schilizzi, (1856) 17 C. B. 619, 25 L. J. C. P. 89, 189 Eng.
Rep. 1219 (mixed with other inferior seeds).
'-Jones v. Just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B.
89.
:':Davis v. Miller, (1894) 10 T. L. R. 286 (Bass's Ale with poisonous
ingTedient); Robert A. Munro & Co. v. Meyer, [1930] 2 K. B. 312, 99
L. J. K. B. 703, 143 L. T. 565 (adulterated bone meal) ; Kefauver v. Price.
(1918) 136 Ark. 342, 206 S. V. 664 ("Orange Sorghum seed") ; Brock v.
Newmark Grain Co., (1923) 64 Cal. App. 517, 222 Pac. 195 (Sonora
wheat) ; Rocky Mountain Seed Co. v. Knorr, (1933) 92 Colo. 320, 20 P.
t2d) 394 (alfalfa seed) ; Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Moll, (1920) 106
Kan. 827, 189 Pac. 940 (flour brand); Denenberg v. Jurad, (1938) 300
Mass. 488, 15 N. E. (2d) 660 ("new car of the year 1933") ; West Coast
Lumber Co. v. Wernicke, (1939) 137 Fla. 363, 188 So. 357 ("Texas Seed
Ribbon Cane" seed); Williams v. McClain, (1937) 180 Miss. 6, 176 So. 717
(year model of Ford automobile) ; Whittaker v. McCormick, (1878) 6 Mo.
Xpp. 114 ("No. 2 white mixed corn") ; Operators Fuel Agency v. Eastern
Fuel Co., (1924) 83 Pa. Super. 598 ("Classified Pool 60 Coal") ; White v.
Miller, (1877) 71 N. Y. 118 ("Bristol cabbage seed") ; Parrish v. Kotthoff,
(1929) 128 Or. 529, 274 Pac. 1108 ("Rosen rye" seed) ; Northwestern
Cordage Co. v. Rice, (1896) 5 N. D. 432, 67 N. W. 298, 57 Am. St. Rep.
563 ("pure Manila tvine") ; Springfield Shingle Co. v. Edgecomb Mill
Co., (1909) 52 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 233 ("Star A Star shingles) ; Foutty
v. Chalmax Sales Co., (1925) 99 W. Va. 300, 128 S. E. 389 (car of par-
ticular model).
G11"It appears to us that, in every contract to supply goods of a specified
description which the buyer has no opportunity to inspect, the goods must
not only in fact answer the specific description, but must also be saleable
or merchantable under that description." Jones v. Just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B.
197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B. 89.
"Upon the sale of goods, by name or description, in the absence of
Mome other controlling stipulation in the contract, a condition is implied
that the goods shall be merchantable under that name. They must be goods
known in the market and among those familiar with that kind of trade by
that description, and of such quality as to have value. This is not a war-
ranty of quality. It does not require any particular grade. It is a require-
ment of identity between the thing which is described as the subject of the
f
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ments. The buyer-who in the earlier cases"' was himself a dealer-
must be assured the possibility of resale if he so desires; and
here it seems clear that the warranty of merchantable quality
overlaps its twin implied warranty of fitness for the buyer's par-
ticular purpose.62 Or, if he buys for use, he is still assured that
he is receiving what dealers customarily sell, and what he might
buy elsewhere under the same name."2
It is not enough that the goods are capable of sale to somebody
at some price; they must be acceptable generally on the market
under the same name or description. Nor, of course, is it
enough that they would pass in the first instance on their appear-
ance, with their defects concealed; they must be marketable with
trade and the thing proffered in performance of it. The buyer is entitled
to receive goods fairly answerable to the description contained in his con-
tract of sale. It does not matter whether the deleterious characteristic is
latent or obvious, provided it goes to the extent of changing the nature
of the goods, so that they have no value in the market under the designation
contained in the contract of sale .... Upon a sale even by a casual owner
of sardines, he is bound to deliver something which answers that descrip-
tion in the trade. If he does not, he does not perform his contract." Rugg,
C. J., in Inter-State Grocery Co. v. Geo. W. Bentley Co., (1913) 214 Mass.
227, 231, 101 N. E. 147.0
'Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46; Laing v.
Fidgeon, (1815) 6 Taunt. 108, 4 Camp. 169, 128 Eng. Rep. 974; Bridge
v. Wain, (1816) 1 Stark. 504, 171 Eng. Rep. 543; Wieler v. Schilizzi,
(1856) 17 C. B. 619, 25 L. J. C. P. 89, 189 Eng. Rep. 1219; Jones v. Just,
(1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B. 89.
62American Soda Fountain Co. v. Medford Grocery Co., (1928) 128
Or. 83, 262 Pac. 939; Parker v. Shaghalian & Co., (1923) 244 Mass. 19,
138 N. E. 236; Mones v. Imperial Bottling Works, (1936) 14 N. J. Misc.
369, 185 Atl. 483; Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy, (1914) 167 N. C. 427,
83 S. E. 567; Berry v. Wadhams Oil Co., (1914) 156 Wis. 588, 146 N. V.
783. 63"The phrase [merchantable quality] is, in my opinion, used as mean-
ing that the article is of such quality and in such condition that a reason-
able man acting reasonably would after a full examination accept it under
the circumstances of the case in performance of his offer to buy that article
whether he buys for his own use or to sell again." Bristol Tramways v.
Fiat Motors, Ltd., [1910] 2 K. B. 831, 79 L. J. K. B. 1107, 103 L. T. 443,
Accord: International Business Machines Co. v. Scherban, [1925] 1 Com.
L. Rep. 864; Frigorifico Wilson de la Argentina v. Weirton Steel Co..
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1933) 62 F. (2d) 677; Ganoung v. Daniel Reeves, Inc.,
(1933) 149 Misc. 515, 268 N. Y. S. 325; Colt Co. v. Bridges, (1926) 162
Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889; Keenan v. Cherry & Webb, (1925) 47 R. I. 125,
131 Atl. 309; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, (1931) 255 N. Y. 388,
175 N. E. 105, 74 A. L. R. 339.
64Thus in Jones v. Just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37
L. J. Q. B. 89, the fact that the Manila hemp wetted by sea water was in
fact resold at auction as "Manila hemp with all faults" at about 75 per cent
of the original price, did not prevent the goods from being unmerchantable.
Accord: Niblett v. Confectioners' Materials Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 387 (resold
with brand removed).
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABLE QUALITY
their true character known,65 and the fact that the buyer's cus-
tomers return them to him after purchase is at least strong evi-
dence that they are not of merchantable quality.66 "Saleable" in
the market means not only that the goods themselves are of pass-
able quality, but also that they are not improperly packed 7 or
labeled -' so as to interfere with their resale under the same
description; that they are not in dangerous containers ;69 that
they have no unnecessary unpleasant odor ;70 that their sale or
resale in the same market does not violate any applicable statute;7'
and even that the resale will not subject the buyer to liability for
infringement of another's trade mark,7 2 or require him to pay a
license tax not necessary for the goods as described.7 3
Apparently, so far as the warranty of merchantable quality
is concerned, all that the buyer can demand is that the goods shall
" "Merchantable does not mean that the thing is saleable in the market
simply because it looks all right; it is not merchantable in that event if it
has defects unfitting it for its only proper use but not apparent on ordinary
examination." Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85, 105
L. J. P. C. 6, 154 L. T. 18, 52 T. L. R. 38. Accord: Morelli v. Fitch &
Gibbons, [1928] 2 K. B. 636, 97 L. J. K. B. 812, 140 L. T. 21, 44 T. L. R.
737; Young v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (W.D. Pa. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 1018;
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, (1931) 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105,
74 A. L. R. 339; Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, (1936) 57 Ohio App. 190, 13
N. E. (2d) 130; Inter-State Grocery Co. v. Geo. W. Bentley Co., (1913)
214 Mass. 227, 101 N. E. 147.
'1Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy, (1914) 167 N. C. 427, 83 S. E.
567; De Shoop Family Medicine Co. v. Davenport, (1913) 163 N. C. 294,
79 S. E. 602; Continental Jewelry Co. v. Stanfield, (1922) 183 N. C. 10,
110 S. E. 585; Kasler and Cohen v. Slavonski, [19281 1 K. B. 78, 98 L. J.
K. B. 850.
6 7Moore & Co., Ltd., v. Landauer & Co. [1921] 2 K B . 519, 90 L. J.
K. B. 731 (wrong size tins).
OScaliaris v. E. Ofverberg & Co., (1921) 37 T. L. R. 307; Gaston,
Williams & Wigmore, Ltd., v. Scaliaris, (1920) 2 Lloyds L. L. Rep. 275;
Sassoon & Co. v. Lindsay, Bendix & Co., (1922) 13 Lloyds L. L. Rep 280
("there was something in the term Pilsener which made it acceptable to
the beer drinker, especially in Baghdad").
13'Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, [1928] 2 K. B. 636, 97 L. J. K. B. 812,
140 L. T. 21, 44 T. L. R. 737; Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., (1940)
127 Conn. 44, 15 A. (2d) 181.
70Berry v. Wadhams Oil Co., (1914) 156 Wis. 588, 146 N. W. 783
(gasoline) ; McNabb v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., (1938) 272
Ky. 112, 113 S. W. (2d) 470 (natural gas).7 1Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., (1937)
93 Utah 414, 72 P. (2d) 1272 (United States Food and Drug Act) ; Mones
v. Imperial Bottling Works, (1936) 14 N. J. Misc. 369, 185 At. 483 (New
Jersey Food and Drugs Act) ; Manning Mfg. Co. v. Hartol Products Corp.,
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 813 (kerosene igniting at less than
statutory temperature); Lash, Inc. v. A. C. Ogden Milk Co., (1937) 163
Misc. 407, 297 N. Y. S. 1008 (prohibited sale of flavor base).72Niblett v. Confectioners' Materials Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 387 (Sale
of Goods Act covers package and brand).73Haynor Mfg. Co. v. Davis, (1908) 147 N. C. 267, 61 S. E. 54, 17
L. R. A. (N. S.) 193 (alcoholic beverages sold as not alcoholic).
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be saleable in the market in which he buys. 4 If he seeks an
assurance that they can be sold elsewhere, he must exact an ex-
press warranty, or look to the implied warranty of fitness for his
"particular" purpose.75 Likewise the time as of which merchant-
able quality is to be invoked is that of the passage of title, and if
goods are to be shipped there is ordinarily no implication that
they will stand shipment, or continue merchantable for any
period after sale.76 Again, however, the "particular" purpose
may require goods of a quality or condition to stand shipment
when shipped, 77 and if title is to pass at destination, the goods must
of course be merchantable when they arrive.78
3. Fit for the ordinary uses and purposes of such goods. It
was recognized quite early that goods cannot be expected to pass
on the market, and hence are not of merchantable quality, unless
they are reasonably fit for the ordinary uses to which goods of
that kind are put. "The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy
goods to lay them on a dunghill; ' '79 nor do dealers customarily
offer useless goods to their trade. It follows that when a dealer
contracts to sell a barge, he is understood to be selling something
reasonably fit for ordinary use as a barge, 0 and the same is true
74Sumner, Permain & Co. v. Webb & Co., [1922] 1 K. B. 55, 91 L. J.
K. B. 228, 38 T. L. R. 45, 126 L. T. 294 (marketable in London where
sold, prohibited by statute in Argentina where destined for resale; held
to be of "merchantable quality").
75Wilford Hall Laboratories v. Schoenfeld, (1918) 182 App. Div. 504,
169 N. Y. S. 912 (for sale in Argentina) ; Bencoe Exporting & Importing
Co. v. Erie City Iron Works, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1922) 280 Fed. 690 (boiler
plates "for export" must be exportable) ; Pease v. Sabin, (1866) 38 Vt.
432, 97 Am. Dec. 364 (fitness for sale in foreign market).
76English v. Spokane Commission Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1893) 57 Fed.
45 (eggs); Leggat v. Sands Brewing Co., (1871) 60 Ill. 158 (ale);
Rinelli v. Rubino, (1918) 68 Ind. App. 314, 120 N. E. 388 (apples) ; Bull
v. Robison, (1854) 10 Ex. 342 (iron) ; cf. Ryan v. Ulmer, (1895) 108 Pa.
332, 56 Am. Rep. 210. It must be recognized, however, that merchantable
quality at the time of sale may necessarily include the capacity to continue
sound and saleable for a reasonable length of time. Philip Olim & Co. v.
C. A. Watson & Sons, (1920) 204 Ala. 179, 85 So. 460.7
'Mann v. Everston, (1869) 32 Ind. 355; Leopold v. Van Kirk, (1870)
27 Wis. 152; Southern Produce Co. v. Oteri, (1910) 94 Ark. 318, 126
S. W. 1065; Truschel v. Dean, (1906) 77 Ark. 546, 92 S. W. 781; Stella
v. Smith, (1930) 109 Cal. App. 409, 293 Pac. 656; Harp v. Haas-Phillips
Produce Co., (1921) 205 Ala. 573, 88 So. 740; Mobile Fruit & Trading Co.
v. McGuire, (1900) 81 Minn. 232, 83 N. W. 833. These cases make it
clear, however, that the seller does not warrant condition on arrival, but
merely fitness for shipment when shipped.
78Atkins Bros. Co. v. Southern Grain Co., (1906) 119 Mo. App. 119,
95 S. W. 949. Cf. Harp v. Haas-Phillips Produce Co., (1921) 205 Ala.
573, 88 So. 740; Ashford v. Shrader Co., (1914) 167 N. C. 45, 83 S. E. 29.79Lord Ellenborough, in Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 145,
171 Eng. Rep. 46.
8°Shepherd v. Pybus, (1842) 3 Man. & G. 868, 42 E. C. L. 452, 111 L. J.
C. P. 101, 133 Eng. Rep. 1390.
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of an automobile,"' a piano, 2 a hot water bottle,83 milk,8 4 fer-
tilizer,s5 food, 0 clothing,87 furniture,88 or any other marketed
commodity."' On this purely contractual basis of an understanding
implied in fact, it has long been recognized that merchantable
quality is reflected in use value as well as exchange value, and that
"Franklin Motor Car Co. v. Ratliff, (1922) 207 Ala. 341, 92 So. 449;
Harvey v. Buick Motor Co., (Mo. App. 1915) 177 S. W. 774; Meyer v.
Packard Cleveland Motor Co., (1922) 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N. E. 118, 28
A. L. R. 986 (truck) ; G. M1. C. Truck Co. v. Velley, (1924) 105 Okla. 84,
231 Pac. 882 (truck); Swartz v. Edwards Motor Car Co., (1927) 49 R. I.
18, 139 Atl. 466.
SSnow v. Schomacker Mfg. Co., (1881) 61 Ala. 111, 44 Am. Rep. 509.
;'Preist v. Last, [1903] 2 K. B. 148, 72 L. J. K. B. 657, 89 L. T. 33,
19 T. L. R. 527.
81Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Companies, [1905] 1 K. B. 608, 74 L. J.
K. B. 386, 92 L. T. 527, 21 T. L. R. 300.
ZSRadcliff v. Gunby & Co., (1872) 46 Ga. 464; Gammell v. R. B. Gunby
& Co., (1874) 52 Ga. 504.
1,6Beer v. Walker, (1877) 46 L. J. K. B. 677, 37 L. T. 278 (rabbits);
Wallis v. Russell, [1902] 2 Ir. Rep. 585 (crabs) ; Kaull v. Blacker, (1920)
107 Kan. 578, 193 Pac. 182 (flour); Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy.
(1914) 167 N. C. 427, 83 S. E. 567 (red marrow beans) ; American Soda
Fountain Co. v. Medford Grocery Co., (1928) 128 Or. 83, 262 Pac. 939
(fruit syrups) ; Ward Co. v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., (1925) 112 Okla. 119,
240 Pac. 115 (beverage).
81%fandel Bros. v. Mulvey. (1923) 230 Ill. App. 588 (overcoat) ; Bran-
denberg v. Samuel Stores, (1931) 211 Iowa 1321, 235 N. W. 741, 77
A. L. R. 1161 (fur coat) ; Flynn v. Bedell Co., (1922) 242 Mass 450, 136
N. E. 252, 27 A. L. R. 1504 (same) ; Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, (1939)
122 N. J. L. 21, 4 A. (2d) 73 (hat).
s$Cohan v. Markel, (1926) 215 App. Div. 435, 213 N. Y. S. 681.
*JGrisinger v. Hubbard, (1912) 21 Idaho 469, 122 Pac. 853, Ann. Cas.
1913E 87 (fruit trees) ; American Tank Co. v. Revert Oil Co., (1921) 108
Kan. 690, 196 Pac. 111 (oil storage tank) ; Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell &
Braun, (1939) 136 Me. 118, 3 A. (2d) 650 (dress shields); Kansas City
Bolt & Nut Co. v. Rodd, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1915) 220 Fed. 750 (machine);
Parsons Band Cutter & Self Feeder Co. v. Mallinger, (1904) 122 Iowa
703, 98 N. W. 580 (machine) ; McNabb v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas
Co., (1938) 272 Ky. 112, 113 S. W. (2d) 470 (natural gas); Bianchi v.
Denholm & McKay Co., (1939) 302 Mass. 469, 19 N. E. (2d) 697, 121
A. L. R. 460 (face powder) ; Baumgartner v. Glasener, (1927) 171 Minn.
289, 214 N. W. 27 (seed); Colt Co. v. Bridges, (1926) 162 Ga. 154, 132
S. E. 889 (light generator) ; Plymouth Cordage Co. v. Phelps, (1919) 104
Neb. 64, 175 N. W. 603 (binder tvine); McCaskey Register Co. v. W. J.
Bradshaw & Co., (1917) 174 N. C. 414, 93 S. E. 898 (cash register) ; Hall
Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., (1916) 169 N. C. 41, 85 S. E. 35
(hearse) ; Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. New State Shirt & Overall Mfg.
Co., (1914) 42 Okla. 554, 141 Pac. 1111 (sewing machine) ; Dalton Adding
Machine Sales Co. v. Denton, (1925) 109 Okla. 46, 234 Pac. 201 (adding
machine) ; Markle v. Stekoll, (1925) 112 Okla. 287, 240 Pac. 1044 (oil well
casing) ; Trudgeon v. Patterson, (1931) 149 Okla. 68, 299 Pac. 419 (brick-
layers' cement); Wayne Tank & Pump Co. v. Harper, (1926) 118 Okla.
274, 247 Pac. 985 (gasoline pump); Whitaker v. Columbia Weighing
Machine Co., (1928) 131 Okla. 194, 268 Pac. 255 (weighing machine)
Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, (1922) 90 W. Va. 428, 111 S. E. 150(refrigerating unit).
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the two are inseparably linked. 90 Goods are not merchantable if
they cannot be used; and merchantable quality necessarily includes
some reasonable fitness for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are intended, designed and sold.9 1
At this point there enters the companion implied warranty of
fitness for the buyer's "particular" purpose, to which casual
reference has been made before. First appearing in 1829,2 it
developed along somewhat different lines from the warranty of
merchantable quality, and was recognized as a related but different
thing.9 3 It is stated in rather careful terms in the Uniform Sales
Act 94 as follows:
9 0
"The term 'merchantable,' while frequently used as synonymous with
'salable,' may be given a broader connotation to include adaptability to the
immediate use to which it is put. Its exchange value, in final analysis, of
course will depend upon its utility value. But exchange value is not the
sole test of merchantability under this subdivision." Kelvinator Sales Corp.
v. Quabbin Improvement Co., (1931) 234 App. Div. 96, 254 N. Y. S. 123
(refrigerator). Accord, Stephens v. Brill, (1913) 159 Iowa 620, 140 N. W.
809 (vicious horse does not conform to express warranty that it is mer-
chantable).
Even where the goods are new to the market, so that their name or
description has no accepted trade meaning, it has been held that there is at
least a warranty that they are fit for the use for which they purport to be
sold. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co. v. Rodd, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1926) 12 F.
(2d) 969; Rowe Mfg. Co. v. Curtis-Straub Co., (1937) 223 Iowa 858, 273
N. W. 895; American Mine Equipment Co. v. Butler Consolidated Coal
Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 217).91Asfar & Co. v. Blundell, [1896] 1 Q. B. 123, 1 Com. Cas. 185 (dates
-insurance case) ; Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85,
105 L. J. P. C. 6, 154 L. T. 18, 52 T. L. R. 38 (textiles); Remsberg v.
Hackney Mfg. Co., (1917) 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792 (plow) ; Loxtercamp
v. Lininger Implement Co., (1910) 147 Iowa 29, 125 N. W. 830 (defini-
tion); Frigorifico Wilson de la Argentina v. Weirton Steel Co., (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1933) 62 F. (2d) 677 (tin plate) ; Giant Mfg. Co. v. Yates-Ameri-
can Mach. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 360 (coils for cooling
units); Ganoung v. Daniel Reeves, Inc., (1933) 149 Misc. 515, 268 N. Y. S.
325 (dog food); Wallace v. L. D. Clark & Son, (1918) 72 Okla. 208, 174
Pac. 557, 21 A. L. R. 361 (sardines) ; Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., (1907) 196
Mass. 440, 82 N. E. 682, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 855 (combs) ; Peerless Elec-
tric Co. v. Call, (1923) 82 Pa. Super. 550 (fans) ; J. Aron & Co. v. Sills,
(1925) 240 N. Y. 588, 148 N. E. 717 (condensed milk) ; Lexington Grocery
Co. v. Vernoy, (1914) 167 N. C. 427, 83 S. E. 567 (beans which could not
be cooked and remained so hard they "rattled in the pan") ; Swift v.
Etheridge, (1925) 190 N. C. 162, 129 S. E. 453 (fertilizer) ; Keenan v.
Cherry & Webb, (1925) 47 R. I. 125, 131 AUt. 309 (fur coat).
"It would seem, therefore, that a watch that will not keep time, a pen
that will not write, and tobacco which will not smoke, cannot be regarded
as merchantable under such names." Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., (1930) 136 Misc. 468, 241 N. Y. S. 233, aff'd (1931) 232 App. Div.
822, 249 N. Y. S. 924 (dead mouse in smoking tobacco).92 Jones v. Bright, (1829) 5 Bing. 533, 3 Moo. & P. 155, 130 Eng. Rep.
1167.9 3See Jones v. Just, (1866) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & . 141, 37 L. J.
Q. B. 89; Randall v. Newson, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 102.
94Sec. 15 (1), 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8390 (1). Taken, with
minor changes in wording, from the Sale of Goods Act, sec. 14 (1).
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Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or
judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit
for such purposes.
It should be observed first, that this warranty is not limited
to sales made by dealers, although it obviously may include them.
Second, it requires reliance of the buyer upon some "skill or
judgment" of the seller, which the warranty of merchantable
quality does not. The buyer's purpose is made known to the
seller, the thing ordered is "something to fit my purpose," and
the seller undertakes the responsibility of supplying it. The
typical case is that of an order to a carriage-builder to make a
pole for the buyer's carriage.05 In the beginning, this was put
on the contractual basis of actual but unexpressed understanding.
In the later cases, the continued emphasis upon the buyer's re-
liance and the seller's supposed superior judgment or informa-
tion about the goods has led many courts to put it on the basis
of misrepresentation, and treat it as a matter of tort. Whether
it be called tort or contract is perhaps unimportant; no doubt
it is both, and on either basis at least the element of reliance is
essential. Finally, the warrant, does not call for any standard
goods of a kind commonly sold on the market, but rather for
something to fit the use which the buyer is known to intend. His
"particular" purpose may be something quite apart from the
ordinary uses of the article. Goods may be merchantable and still
be unfit for some unusual use intended ;9 they may even be un-
merchantable and still fit, as where stale bread is sold for chicken
feed.
Nevertheless, the two warranties are neither inconsistent nor
mutually exclusive, and there are obviously many sales made by
dealers in which they will co-exist, and amount to precisely the
same thing. It is well settled that the "particular" purpose of the
buyer means nothing more than the intended use of which the
seller is informed, and that it need not be anything apart from
9ZRandall v. Newson, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 102.
07;Jones v. Bright, (1829) 5 Bing. 533, 3 Moo. & P. 155, 130 Eng. Rep.
1167; Shepherd v. Pybus, (1842) 3 Man. & G. 868, 42 E. C. L. 452, 11
L. J. C. P. 101, 133 Eng. Rep. 1390; Remsberg v. Hackney Mfg. Co.,(1917) 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792; The E 270, (D. Mass. 1927) 16 F. (2d)
1005; Standard Rice Co. v. P. R. Warren Co., (1928) 262 Mass. 261, 159
N. E. 508.
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the ordinary use to which such goods are put." When a fur
coat is sold to a customer by a department store, it is sold to wear,
and is warranted fit to wear; and whether the warranty is called
one of merchantable quality or fitness for the purpose is of small
consequence." The distinction becomes important only when
some prescribed element of one is removed-in which case the
other may remain in force 9' In particular, when the reliance
on the seller's supposed skill or judgment or superior informa-
tion, necessary to the "particular purpose" warranty, is lacking,
the contractual obligation to furnish goods of merchantable
quality answering the description may still be found.'0 0
"Fitness for the purpose" is an attractive phrase, and the
97Wallis v. Russell, [1902] 2 Ir. Rep. 585; Grant v. Australian Knit-
ting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85, 105 L. J. P. C. 6, 154 L. T. 18, 52 T. L. R. 38;
American Tank Co. v. Revert Oil Co., (1921) 108 Kan. 690, 196 Pac. 1111;
Brandenberg v. Samuel Stores. (1931) 211 Iowa 1321, 235 N. W. 741, 77
A. L. R. 1161; Parsons Band Cutter & Self Feeder Co. v. Mallinger,
(1904) 122 Iowa 703, 98 N. W. 580; Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor
Co., (1922) 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N. E. 118, 28 A. L. R. 986; Minneapolis
Steel & Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, (1924) 51 N. D. 832, 201
N. W. 172; cf. American Soda Fountain Co. v. Medford Grocery Co.,
(1928) 128 Or. 83, 262 Pac. 939.
OsKeenan v. Cherry & Webb, (1925) 47 R. I. 125, 131 Atl. 309. Accord:
Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85, 105 L. J. P. C. 6, 154
L. T. 18, 52 T. L. R. 38 (textiles); Frigorifico Wilson de la Argentina v.
Weirton Steel Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1933) 62 F. (2d) 677 (tin plate);
Dunbar Bros. Co. v. Consolidated Iron-Steel Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1928) 23 F. (2d) 416 (dictum) ; Kelvinator Sales Corp. v. Quabbin Improve-
ment Co., (1931) 234 App. Div. 96, 254 N. Y. S. 123 (refrigerator) ; Foley
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., (1930) 136 Misc. 468, 241 N. Y. S. 233.
aff'd (1931) 232 App. Div. 822, 249 N. Y. S. 924 (smoking tobacco);
Ganoung v. Daniel Reeves, Inc., (1933) 149 Misc. 515, 268 N. Y. S. 325
(dog food); Wallace v. L. D. Clark & Son, (1918) 74 Okla. 208, 174 Pac.
557, 21 A. L. R. 361 (sardines) ; Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., (1907) 196
Mass. 440, 82 N. E. 682, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 855 (combs) ; Colt Co. v.
Bridges, (1926) 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889 (light generator); J. Aron
& So. v. Sills, (1925) 240 N. Y. 588, 148 N. E. 717 (condensed milk).
99Thus: (a) if the sale is not made by a dealer, or if it is not made
"by description," the warranty, if any, must be one of fitness for the par-
ticular purpose only; and (b) if the intended use is not made known to the
seller, or if it does not appear that the buyer relies upon the seller's sup-
posed skill or judgment, the warranty must be one of merchantable quality.
10OBristol Tramways & Carriage Co. v. Fiat Motors [1910] 2 K. B.
831, 79 L. J. K. B. 1107, 103 L. T. 443, 26 T. L. R. 629; Appalachian Power
Co. v. Tate, (1922) 90 W. Va. 428, 111 S. E. 150; Remsberg v. Hackney
Mfg. Co., (1917) 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792; Gary Coast Agency v. Lawry,(1921) 101 Or. 623, 201 Pac. 214; G. M. C. Truck Co. v. Kelley, (1924)
105 Okla. 84, 231 Pac. 882; Colt Co. v. Bridges, (1926) 162 Ga. 154, 132
S. E. 889; Herbert v. W. C. Mahon Co., (1918) 211 Ill. App. 297;
Frigorifico Wilson de la Argentina v. Weirton Steel Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1933) 62 F. (2d) 677; Daniels v. White & Sons, Ltd., [1938] 4 All Eng.
Rep. 258; Parker v. Shaghalian & Co., (1923) 244 Mass. 19, 138 N. E.
236; Botti v. Venice Grocery Co., (1941) 309 Mass. 450, 35 N. E. (2d)
491; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, (1931) 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E.
105, 74 A. L. R. 339.
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courts have tended to use it in preference to "merchantable
quality." In the great majority of dealer sales, 1' 1 however, the
use intended by the buyer is the ordinary, usual one, clearly lying
within the merchantable quality called for by the implied contract;
and merchantable quality seems to be what in reality is meant.
Contrary to what is perhaps the current impression, that warranty
appears to be the broader, stronger, and more powerful of the two.
The "fitness for the general purpose," as it is sometimes
called, which is necessary to merchantable quality, presents
troublesome questions where the goods delivered are suitable for
some of the ordinary uses of those described but not for others.
On the one hand, it is arguable that the buyer is entitled to fitness
for all usual, customary purposes,10 2 including even that of re-
sale ;"" on the other, that goods may find ready buyers under the
name, and so be entirely marketable, even though they are known
to be fit for only some of the usual uses. 04 The answer that seems
to be found in the cases is that if the particular use is a pre-
dominant one, such as that of making cloth into clothing,' 0 5 or
flour into bread,10 6 the goods are not to be called merchantable
'
0oSee the cases cited supra, notes 80-91.
112Atkins Bros. Co. v. Southern Grain Co., (1906) 119 Mo. App. 119,
95 S. W. 949 (error to charge that corn must be merely fit for some pur-
pose for which it is ordinarily used. The buyer has "a right to use the corn
himself and therefore it should be reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes
to which such corn is put.... He likewise has a right to sell it and there-
fore it should be in such condition as to be merchantable") ; Swartz v.
Edwards Motor Car Co., (1927) 49 R. I. 18, 139 Ati. 466; Leavitt v. Fiber-
loid Co., (1907) 196 Mass. 440, 82 N. E. 682, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 855.
103Geddling v. Marsh, [1920] 1 K. B. 668, 89 L. J. K. B. 526, 122 L. T.
775, 36 T. L. R. 337; American Soda Fountain Co. v. Medford Grocery
Co., (1928) 128 Or. 83, 262 Pac. 939; Parker v. Shaghalian & Co., (1923)
244 Mass. 19, 138 N. E. 236; Mones v. Imperial Bottling Works, (1936)
14 N. J. Misc. 369, 185 AtI. 483; Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy, (1914)
167 N. C. 427, 83 S. E. 567; Berry v. Wadhams Oil Co., (1914) 156 Wis.
588, 146 N. W. 783; Atkins Bros. Co. v. Southern Grain Co., (1906) 119
Mo. App. 119, 96 S. W. 949; Wood v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., (1925) 112
Okla. 119, 240 Pac. 115.
10 4Wright v. Hart, (1837) 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 449, aff'g Hart v.
Wright, (1837) 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 267. Flour fit for making crackers but
not bread was held "marketable." On the facts, it may be doubted that the
same decision would be reached today.
'
05James Drummond & Sons v. E. H. Van Ingen & Co., (1887) 12
App. Cas. 284, 56 L. J. Q. B. 563, 3 T. L. R. 541; Bierman v. City Mills
Co., (1897) 151 N. Y. 482, 45 N. E. 856, 37 L. R. A. 799, 56 Am. St.
Rep. 635.
10°IKaull v. Blacker, (1920) 107 Kan. 578, 193 Pac. 182. Apparently the
same is true if the use is an important one, representing a substantial per-
centage of the total, even though it does not predominate. Cf. McNabb v.
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., (1938) 272 Ky. 112, 113 S. W. (2d)
470 (domestic use of natural gas); Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., (1907) 196
Mass. 440, 82 N. E. 682, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 855 (use of comb material
near fire).
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unless they meet it; but that if it is a relatively minor and infre-
quent one, such as feeding barley to pigs,10 making liveries out
of cloth, 05 or spraying fertilizer by drills, 05 the goods may still
be merchantable, and the buyer must look instead to a warranty
for the "particular purpose" based on his disclosure to the seller.
If the use is considered an abnormal one, such as eating pork
without proper cooking," 0 it does not fall within merchantable
quality, and the seller may assume, in the absence of notice to the
contrary, that it is not intended. Allergies and personal idiosyn-
crasies of the buyer usually have been regarded as abnormal and
not covered;"' but there are two cases involving allergies common
to a substantial percentage of the population where a warranty
of "fitness" has been implied."12
4. Free from defects interferibg with sale or ordinary use.
Frequently the warranty of merchantable quality is stated in
terms of freedom from defects: the goods must "not have any
remarkable defect,"' 3 or any defect rendering them unmarketable.
'
07Canada Atlantic Grain Export Co. v. Eilers, (1929) 35 Com. Cas. 90.
'O'Jones v. Padgett, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 650, 59 L. J. Q. B. 261.
'
09Kaplan v. American Cotton Oil Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1926) 12 F.
(2d) 969.
"
0
°Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co. (1934) 267 Mich. 690, 255 N. W.
414; Holt v. Mann, (1936) 294 Mass. 21, 200 N. E. 403; Feinstein v.
Daniel Reeves, Inc. (D. N.Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 167. Accord: Henry
Porter & Co. v. Lacy, (1937) 268 Ky. 666, 105 S. W. (2d) 818 (improper
operation of refrigerating equipment) ; The E 270 (D. Mass. 1927) 16 F.
(2d) 1005 (unusual use of engine); Standard Rice Co. v. P. R. Warren
Co., (1928) 262 Mass. 261, 159 N. E. 508 (cardboard boxes used in
machine packing of rice) ; cf. Smith-Booth-Usher Co. v. Los Angeles Ice
& Cold Storage Co., (1917) 175 Cal. 136, 165 Pac. 430 (express warranty
of fitness).
In McSpedon v. Kunz, (1936) 271 N. Y. 131, 2 N. E. (2d) 573, 105
A. L. R. 1497, the majority of the court considered that the probability of
use of pork without proper cooking was sufficiently great to impose a
warranty against trichinae.
"Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., (1941) 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A. (2d)
502; Stanton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (1942) 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N. E.(2d) 801; Zager v. F. W. Woolworth Co., (1939) 30 Cal. App. (2d) 324,
86 P. (2d) 389; Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., (1939) 136 Me.
118, 3 A. (2d) 650; Flynn v. Bedell Co., (1922) 242 Mass. 450, 136 N. E.
252, 27 A. L. R. 1504; Bradt v. Holloway, (1922) 242 Mass. 446, 136
N. E. 254. See Barasch, Allergies and the Law (1941) 10 Brooklyn L. Rev.
363; (1942) 26 MINNESO-TA LAW REVIEW 668.
12Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., (1939) 302 Mass. 469, 19 N. E.
(2d) 697 (class not specified); Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, (1939) 122
N. J. L. 21, 4 A. (2d) 73 (four to five per cent of population definitely
allergic, all persons "somewhat sensitive"). Compare, as to express war-
ranty of fitness: Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., (1934) 288 Mass. 234,
192 N. E. 631; McLachlan v. Wilmington Dry Goods Co., (Del. 1941)
22 A. (2d) 851.
"'3Fitch v. Archibald, (1861) 29 N. J. L. 160; Bierman v. City Mills
Co., (1897) 151 N. Y. 482, 45 N. E. 856, 37 L. R. A. 799, 56 Am. St. Rep.
635; McClung v. Kelley, (1866) 21 Iowa 508.
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Obviously what is meant is any defect which would interfere with
sale or ordinary use. "Remarkable" is too strong a word, since
a very trivial defect, such as a broken glass over the dial of a
$294 computing scale, which might be repaired for 30 cents, may
still prevent its sale.114 It is of course not necessary that the
defect be an obvious one, and any latent condition, such as a pin
inside of a loaf of bread,11 which would prevent the purchase if it
were known, is enough. But trifling deficiencies, obviously of no
consequence to anyone, such as the fact that a single screw or
bolt in a machine is not new,"l6 are not to be taken into account.
The usages of the trade and the liberality of customers must of
course be considered; and the precise percentage of sand which
the public will tolerate in its sugar,"'7 the amount of checking
it will accept in the finish of a piano," s or the quantity of alloy
which will pass in a gold watch," 9 may very well be questions for
the jury.
5. Qualiiy and price. Obviously some minimum standard of
quality is called for by a merchantable article. Sometimes this is
expressed by saying that the seller warrants good materials and
workmanship ;120 more often, merely that the goods must pass in
the market and be suitable for ordinary use."'1 As to anything
"'lnternational Business Machines Co. v. Shcherban, [1925] 1 Dom. L.
Rep. 864. Accord, Jackson v. Rotax Motor & Cycle Co., [1910] 2 K. B.
937, 80 L. J. K. B. 38, 103 T. L. R. 411 (horns dented and badly polished).
Cf. Wren v. Holt, [1903] 1 K. B. 610, 72 L. J. K. B. 340, 88 L. T. 282
(small quantity of arsenic in beer).
"'5Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, (1931) 255 N. Y. 388, 175
N. E. 105, 74 A. L. R. 339. Accord: Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, [1928]
2 K. B. 636, 97 L. J. K. B. 812, 140 L. T. 21, 44 T. L. R. 737 (defective
ginger wine bottle) ; Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., (1932) 115 Conn. 249,
161 AtI. 389, 90 A. L. R. 1260 (piece of tin in can of meat) ; Young v. Great
A. & P. Tea Co., (W. D. Pa. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 1018 (dead mouse in
raspberry jam); Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, (1936) 57 Ohio App. 190,
13 N. E. (2d) 130 (exploding cigar) ; Dryden v. Continental Baking Co.,
(Cal. 1937) 67 P. (2d) 686 (glass in bread); Larson v. Farmers Ware-
house Co., (1931) 161 Wash. 640, 297 Pac. 753 (arsenate of lead in alfalfa).
"1'1Everedy Mach. Co. v. Hazle Maid Bakers, (1939) 334 Pa. St. 553,
6 A. (2d) 505.
"'7Gassler v. Eagle Sugar Refinery, (1869) 103 Mass. 351.
1"Wilson v. Lawrence, (1885) 139 Mass. 318.
lf'See Swett v. Shumway, (1869) 102 Mass. 365 ("horn chains" made
partly of hoof).
"'0Beers v. Williams, (1854) 16 Ill. 69; Goulds v. Brophy, (1889) 42
Minn. 109, 43 N. W. 834, 6 L. R. A. 392; Loxtercamp v. Lininger Imple-
ment Co. (1910) 147 Iowa 29, 125 N. W. 830, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 501;
Everedy Mach. Co. v. Hazle Maid Bakers, (1939) 334 Pa. St. 553, 6 A. (2d)
505.
"'Campion v. Marston, (1904) 99 Me. 410, 59 Atl. 548; Murchie v.
Cornell, (1891) 155 Mass. 60; McNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda
Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 397.
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over and above this, unless the contract itself calls for a particular
quality or grade, 12 2 it is well settled that the buyer has no right
to expect it. The "medium quality" proposed in an early New
York case 123 has been rejected, since obviously some goods will
be merchantable that are less than the mean.12 4 The "fair average"
quality recommended by the draft of the Revised Uniform Sales
Act '2 seems to set too lofty a standard, if "fair average" is con-
strued, as it might conceivably be,126 to mean the average of all
that are made or sold. There are clearly goods of the name of so
poor a quality that they cannot be sold readily on the market, and
these the buyer is not required to accept; but above this mer-
chantable minimum, unless he exacts an express warranty or relies
on fitness for his particular purpose disclosed to the seller, he is
not entitled to any particular grade or fineness.
1 2
7
The price paid by the buyer has had little consideration in the
cases. There was an old doctrine of French law, that "a sound
price warrants a sound article," which has passed into the law
of South Carolina and Louisiana.1 28 Because of the doctrine that
consideration need not be adequate, the English courts rejected
22Gould v. Stein, (1889) 149 Mass. 570, 22 N. E. 47, 5 L. R. A. 213,
14 Am. St. Rep. 455 ("of second quality") ; Brandenberg v. Samuel Stores,
(1931) 211 Iowa 1321, 235 N. W. 741, 87 A. L. R. 1161 ("A-No. I fur
coat") ; Whittaker v. McCormick, (1878) 6 Mo. App. 114 ("No. 2 white
mixed corn") ; Operators Fuel Agency v. Eastern Fuel Co., (1924) 83 Pa.
Super. 598 ("Classified Pool 60 Coal") ; Springfield Shingle Co. v. Edge-
comb 'Mill Co., (1909) 52 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 233 ("Star A Star
shingles").
'
23Howard v. Hoey, (1840) 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 350.
124'NcNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1921)
274 Fed. 397; Snelling v. Dine, (1930) 270 Mass. 501, 170 N. E. 403.
12SSee supra, note S.
12,Cf. the meaning given to "fair average" in Swift & Co. v. Board of
Assessors, (1905) 115 La. 321, 38 So. 1006, 1007.2 Baer & Co. v. Mobile Cooperage & Box Mfg. Co., (1909) 159 Ala.
491, 49 So. 92; Gallagher v. Waring, (1832) 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 20; Inter-
State Grocery Co. v. Geo. V. Bentley Co., (1913) 214 Mass. 227, 101 N. E.
147; Taylor v. Dalton, (1862) 3 F. & F. 263 ("good or bad does not matter
if the goods fill the description") ; Kenney v. Grogan, (1911) 17 Cal. App.
527, 120 Pac. 433 (not warranted as good as average) ; McNeil & Higgins
Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 297: Vallace
v. L. D. Clark & Son, (1918) 74 Okla. 208, 174 Pac. 557, 21 A. L. R. 361
(not the best, not the poorest, such as generally sold on the market);
Warner v. Arctic Ice Co., (1883) 74 Me. 475 ("mediocrity, or somethingjust above") ; Snelling v. Dine, (1930) 270 'fass. 501, 170 N. E. 403;
Adolph Goldmark & Sons v. Simon Bros. Co., (1923) 110 Neb. 614, 194
N. W. 686.
128Vaughn v. Campbell, (1806) 2 Brev. (S. C.) 53; Champneys v.
Johnson, (1809) 2 Brev. (S. C.) 268; Sanders v. Landroth Seed Co.,
(1914) 100 S. C. 389, 84 S. E. 880; Dewees v. Morgan, (1807) 1 Mart.
(La.) 1; Melancon v. Robichaux, (1841) 17 La. 97.
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it quite early,1 -' and other American jurisdictions continue to
repeat that it is not accepted.'" Yet it is difficult to escape the
conviction that the price cannot be left out of account. It has
been held that a price materially below apparent value shows
that the buyer understands that he is receiving low-grade or
defective goods ;1 and if this is true, the converse would seem
to follow. Certainly jewelry sold at Tiffany's is understood by
both parties to be something better than that sold at Woolworth's,
although both no doubt are merchantable as "jewelry." If there
are ten grades of sardines on the market, a buyer who pays the
market price of the first can scarcely be supposed to be con-
tracting for the tenth; and the fact that off-grade goods circulate
freely at a discount should not, in reason, affect the bargain in a
sale by a reputable dealer at full price. There are a few rather
vague indications"2 that the price paid bears upon what the
seller undertakes in the way of merchantable quality; and when
the issue is squarely presented, it may be expected that the buyer
will be held entitled, not to the value of his money, but at least
to a grade not entirely and hopelessly out of line with what he
has paid.
SALE By DESCRIPTION
Such being the warranty of merchantable quality, the ques-
tion remains, when does it arise? It is limited by the Sales
Act to goods "bought by description."1 33 In the earliest case"'
from which the warranty sprang, there -was an executory contract
for the delivery of described goods which the buyer never had
"-"Stuart v. Wilkins, (1778) 1 Douglas 18; Parkinson v. Lee, (1802)
2 East 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389.1UKDean v. Mason, (1822) 4 Conn. 428, 10 Am. Dec. 162; Moore v.
McKinley, (1855) 5 Cal. 471; Rhynas v. Keck, (1917) 179 Iowa 422, 161
N. W. 486; Johnston v. Cope, (1810) 3 Har. & J. (Md.) 89, 5 Am. Dec.
423; Mixer v. Coburn, (1846) 11 Met. (52 Mass.) 559, 45 Am. Dec. 230;
Weimer v. Clement, (1860) 37 Pa. 147, 78 Am. Dec. 411; Beninger v.
Corwin, (1854) 24 N. J. L. 257; Hoe v. Sanborn, (1860) 21 N. Y. 552,
78 Am. Dec. 163; King v. Quidnick Co., (1883) 14 R. I. 131.
13iFruit Dispatch Co. v. C. C. Taft Co., (1924) 197 Iowa 409, 197
N. W. 302; Warner v. Arctic Ice Co., (1883) 74 Me. 475; Hoe v. Sanborn,(1860) 21 N. Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163.13'Boothby v. Scales, (1871) 27 Wis. 626 (sale by a manufacturer at
a fair price warrants reasonable fitness for the general purpose) ; Adolph
Goldmark & Sons v. Simon Bros. Co., (1923) 110 Neb. 614, 194 N. W.
686 ("vendible on the market in the ordinary course of business and at
the average price [the market price paid ?] of such article"). Cf. Jones v.just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B. 89 (resale
at 75 per cent of original price not enough).
233 See supra, text at note 1.
134Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46.
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seen, and consequently the description in terms was the only
identification of the subject-matter of the contract. From this
merchantable quality according to the description was easily to
be inferred. "Sale by description," then, includes at least those
cases in which "the identification of the goods which are the
subject matter of the bargain depends upon the description," and
the description is therefore "necessary to fix the identity of the
property sold."' 35
Such a description may be a very general one: "waste silk,"","
"prime bacon,'137 "ice,""' or "superfine flour." 3" The seller is
then free to deliver any article of that name, provided only that
it is of merchantable quality, and he has obviously a wide range
of choice. But frequently the description is full, exact and detailed:
the buyer, for example, may order and the seller undertake to
supply a machine of definite size, model and capacity and of a
particular make.140 In such a case the seller's range of selection
is so curtailed, and the buyer has expressed such ideas of his
own, that usually' 4' it cannot be said that he is relying upon the
skill or judgment of the seller to furnish him something for his
purpose. Accordingly, it is commonly held that the "particular
purpose" warranty does not arise.' 4' There still remains, how-
ever, the obligation of the contract itself to deliver goods con-
forming to the description, which means, here as elsewhere, goods
capable of sale on the market under the description, and reason-
1354 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936), 2771.
136Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46.
137Yeats v. Pim, (1815) 2 J. 3. Marsh. 141.
"3'Campion v. Marston, (1904) 99 Me. 410, 59 Ati. 548.
"'9Baird, Miller & Baldwin v. Matthews, (1838) 6 Dana (30 Ky. 130).
14OGrand Ave. Hotel Co. v. Wharton, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1897) 79 Fed.
43 ("Harrison safety boilers of 150 horse power each" with minute specifi-
cations of material and construction) ; Holt v. Sims, (1905) 94 Minn. 157,
102 N. W. 386 ("No. 3 St. Paul boiler with rated capacity of 320 feet") ;
Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Co., (1891) 141 U. S. 510, 12 Sup. Ct. 46,
35 L. Ed. 837 ("162 size refrigerating machine") ; Davis Calyx Drill Co.
v. Mallory, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 137 Fed. 332 ("F-3 drill").
14'Not always, particularly where the seller recommends the detailed
description to the buyer as suitable for the purpose. Williamson Daily News
v. Linograph Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 523; Truslow v.
Diamond Bottling Corp., (1930) 112 Conn. 181, 151 Atl. 492, 71 A. L. R.
1142; London Guaranty Co. v. Strait Scale Co., (1929) 322 Mo. 502, 15
S. W. (2d) 706, 64 A. L. R. 936; Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co. (1929)
151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050.
142Chanter v. Hopkins, (1838) 4 M. & W. 399, 1 Horn & H. 377, 8
L. J. Ex. 14, 150 Eng. Rep. 1484; R. B. Tyler Co. v. Hampton Cracker
Co., (1936) 265 Ky. 236, 96 S. W. (2d) 593; Kull v. Noble, (1928) 178
Ark. 496, 10 S. W. (2d) 992; Cosgrove v. Bennett, (1884) 32 Minn. 371,
30 N. W. 359; Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, (1922) 90 W. Va. 428, 111
S. E. 150; and see cases cited supra, note 140.
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ably fit for the general use for which such goods are made and
sold. This is not a matter of reliance upon the seller's judgment;
it is merely a definition implied and understood in the agreement
made. Therefore it is generally agreed that even on the sale
of a definitely described article there is an implied warranty of
merchantable quality." 3
One common form of description is a brand or trade name.
Here again, if the buyer orders goods by such a name, it is
usually apparent that he is not relying upon the skill or judgment
of the seller, but upon his own experience, the reputation or
advertising of the maker, or what he has been told by others, so
that no warranty of fitness for the "particular purpose" is to be
implied;' and the Sales Act, in a rather unhappily worded
clause,"' so provides. The courts have not looked with any
great favor upon the provision, and have held, where the trade
name has been mentioned only incidentally," 6 or the buyer has
never heard of it before' 47 or the initiative in -selecting it is taken
by the seller, L ' that there is no "sale under a trade name" within
"'Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Co., (1891) 141 U. S. 510, 12 Sup.
Ct. 46, 35 L. Ed. 837; Cosgrove v. Bennett, (1884) 32 Minn. 371, 30 N. W.
359; Flaherty v. Maine Motor Carriage Co., (1918) 117 Me. 376, 104 Atl.
627; Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., (1907) 196 Mass. 440, 82 N. E. 682, 15
L. R. A. (N. S.) 855; Davis Calyx Drill Co. v. Mallory, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1905) 137 Fed. 332; Frigorifico Wilson de ]a Argentina v. Weirton Steel
Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1933) 62 F. (2d) 677. See also, as to trade name,
infra, note 150.
1"Daniels v. White & Son, Ltd., [1938] 4 All Eng. Rep. 258; Remsberg
v. Hackney Mfg. Co., (1917) 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792; Botti v. Venice
Grocery Co., (1941) 309 Mass. 450, 35 N. E. (2d) 491; Ryan v. Progres-
sive Grocery Stores, (1931) 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105, 74 A. L. R. 339.1'4-Sec. 15 (4), 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8390 (4): "In the
case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its patent or
other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any par-
ticular purpose."
The draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act (see supra, note 8) would
repeal this clause, providing in sec. 15 (4) that sale under a patent or trade
name does not negative the implied warranties of fitness for the particular
purpose or merchantable quality.
" Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Rodziewicz, (1936) 125 Pa. Super. 240; Sperry
Flour Co. v. De Ioss, (1933) 141 Or. 440, 18 P. (2d) 242, 90 A. L. R.
406; Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., (1929) 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac.
1050; Baldry v. Marshall, [1925] 1 K. B. 260, 94 L. J. K. B. 208, 132 L. T.
326.
"'tTIron Fireman Coal Stoker Co. v. Brown, (1931) 182 Minn. 399, 234
N. W. 685; Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., (1939) 136 Me. 512,
3 A. (2d) 650; Barrett v. Panther Rubber Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1928)
24 F. (2d) 329. Particularly if the name is not known to the trade. Western
Cabinet & Fixture Ifg. Co. v. Davis, (1915) 121 Ark. 370, 181 S. W. 273;
Rowe Mfg. Co. v. Curtis-Straub Co., (1937) 223 Iowa 858, 273 N. W. 895;
American Mine Equipment Co. v. Butler Consolidated Coal Co., (C.C.A.
3d Cir. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 217.
145Davenport Ladder Co. v. Edward Hines Lbr. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1930) 43 F. (2d) 63; Ralston Purina Co. v. Novak, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940)
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the statute, and a warranty of fitness may be implied. In any
case, however, it stands undisputed that, regardless of all reliance
upon his skill or judgment, the seller's contract obligation stands
to deliver an article which is true to the name,1 41 capable of sale
under it, without serious defects, and fit for the ordinary uses
for which the brand is made and sold-in short, a standard article
of merchantable quality according to the description.'"
There has been little discussion of the problem that arises
where the entire line of goods identified with the trade name is
of unmerchantable quality. In one English case, 1 the court
seems to have been willing to impose the warranty upon a re-
111 F. (2d) 631; Drumar Mining Co. v. Morris Ravine Mining Co., (1939)
33 Cal. App. (2d) 492, 92 P. (2d) 424; Ireland v. Louis K. Liggett Co.,
(1922) 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371.
149McDaniel v. Davis, (1933) 186 Ark. 962, 56 S. W. (2d) 1022;
Kansas City Flour Mills v. Moll, (1920) 106 Kan. 827, 189 Pac. 940. The
seller's obligation is to deliver the brand as now manufactured, not as it
may have been in the past. Harris & Sons v. Plymouth Varnish & Colour
Co., Ltd., (1933) 49 T. L. R. 521.
'
5 OBristol Tramways v. Fiat Motors, Ltd., [1910] 2 K. B. 831, 79
L. J. K. B. 1107, 103 L. T. 443; Daniels v. White & Sons, Ltd., [1938]
4 All Eng. Rep. 258; Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, [1928] 2 K. B. 636, 97
L. J. K. B. 812, 140 L. T. 21, 44 T. L. R. 737; Remsberg v. Hackney M fg.
Co., (1917) 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792; Oil Well Supply Co. v. Watson.
(1907) 168 Ind. 603, 80 N. E. 157, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868; McNeil &
Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 397;
Giant Mfg. Co. v. Yates-American Mach. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 111
F. (2d) 360; Bencoe Exporting & Importing Co. v. McGraw Tire & Rub-
ber Co., (1925) 215 App. Div. 136, 208 N. Y. S. 4; Kelvinator Sales Corp.
v. Quabbin Improvement Co., (1931) 234 App. Div. 96, 254 N. Y. S. 123;
Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., (1930) 136 Misc. 468, 241 N. Y. S.
233, aff'd (1931) 232 App. Div. 822, 249 N. Y. S. 924; Parker v. Shaghalian
& Co., (1923) 244 Mass. 19, 138 N. E. 236; Botti v. Venice Grocery Co.,
(1941) 309 Mass. 450, 35 N. E. (2d) 491; Patterson Foundry & Mach.
Co. v. Detroit Stove Works, (1925) 230 Mich. 518, 202 N. W. 957;
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, (1931) 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E.
105, 74 A. L. R. 339; Sperry Flour Co. v. De Moss, (1933) 141 Or. 440.
18 P. (2d) 242, 90 A. L. R. 406; Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, (1936) 57
Ohio App. 190, 13 N. E. (2d) 130.
See Mechem, Implied and Oral Warranties in the Sale of Goods by
Trade Name, (1927) 11 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 485; Brown, Implied
Warranties of Quality in Sales of Articles Under Patent or Trade Names,
(1924) 2 Wis. L. Rev. 385; Note (1931) 16 Corn. L. Q. 610.
'15 Wren v. Holt, [1903] 1 K. B. 610, 72 L. 3. K. B. 340, 88 L. T. 282.
So far as appears on the face of the opinions, the same may be true of
Kelvinator Sales Corp. v. Quabbin Improvement Co., (1931) 234 App. Div.
96, 254 N. Y. S. 123, and Patterson Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Detroit Stove
Works, (1925) 230 Mich. 518, 202 N. W. 957, where the sale was made by
the manufacturer. In McNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co.,
(S.D. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 397, it is said that there would be no warranty
if the brand itself was inferior quality and the buyer knew it.
(Is it not asking a great deal to require the poor grocer to warrant
that Limburger cheese is "fit for human consumption"? See Zenkel v.
Oneida County Creameries Co., (1918) 104 Misc. Rep. 251, 171 N.Y.S.
676.)
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tailer where all of "Holden's Beer" contained arsenic, apparently
on the theory that "Holden's Beer" at least meant "beer." But
in such a case the buyer is given what he asks for, and the seller
is not reasonably understood to agree to deliver something better
than the brand. It is suggested that the Michigan case 52 reach-
ing the contrary conclusion is to be preferred.
SPECIFIc GOODS
More troublesome questions arise where the contract is for
the sale of a specific, identified article. Professor Williston'5" and
Professor Thompson 1 ' have lent their formidable authority to
the view that a "sale by description"155 under the Sales Act, and
hence the warranty of merchantable quality, should be confined
to cases where the description is essential to the identification of
the goods sold, and they cannot be identified without it. It is a
rash man who would disagree with these pre-eminent writers;
and yet, with deference, it may be suggested that this position
is not supported by the cases, and cannot be maintained.
In the first place, it is clear that a description, with the implica-
tion of merchantable quality which it carries, may form an essential
part of a contract for the sale of a particular, otherwise identified
thing. Even if the description be treated merely as an express
warranty, " the question of its meaning in the light of market
understanding remains. Two leading English cases, from which
the language of the statute sprang, both involved the sale of known,
identified cargoes in transit, and the description as "waste silk"'' 7
or "manila hemp ''1ss was held to warrant merchantable quality.
There are many other cases to the same effect. 59
When the goods are in the presence of the buyer at the time
l5*Outhwaite v. A. B. Knowlson Co., (1932) 259 Mich. 224, 242 N. W.
895: "Breach of warranty was not shown by proof that the product was of
poor quality without going further and showing that ordinary Elastica as
generally sold was different."
153l Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924), sec. 224.
1544 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936), sec. 1008.
f"The phrase has been omitted in the draft of the Revised Uniform
Sales Act. See supra, note 8.
1'5Recommended in I Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924), sec. 224; 4 Wil-
liston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936), see. 1108.
157Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46.
l5 5Jones v. Just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J.
Q. B. 89.
1-OVarley v. Whipp, [1900] 1 Q. B. 513; Campion v. Marston, (1904)
99 Me. 410, 59 Atl. 548; Murchie v. Cornell, (1891) 155 Mass. 60, 29 N. E.
207, 14 L. R. A. 492, 31 Am. St. Rep. 526; Hood v. Bloch, (1886) 29
W. Va. 244, 11 S. E. 910.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
he agrees to buy, no difference in principle is to be observed. To
put an extreme case, suppose that a customer enters a hardware
store to ask for a hammer, and the seller hands him something
wrapped in a package. Here is a sale of a specific article; but
is there any doubt that the contract of sale implies an undertaking
of the seller that the thing in the package is a hammer, the kind
of thing commonly sold in hardware stores as a hammer, and
reasonably fit for ordinary uses to which hammers are put? And
if the object 'inside is a saw, or, equally, a hammer with a loose
head, is it to be disputed that the seller has broken his contract?
And does not precisely this situation arise when beans are sold
sealed in a can?"'0
If the buyer has examined the specific goods before purchase,
it is of course clear that as to all visible defects he cannot expect
any such undertaking.161 The seller has said to him, in effect, "I
propose to sell you what you see;" and if he buys on such an
offer, he cannot afterwards complain. But where the defect is
a latent one, any accompanying description, whether it be "a
barge," 16 °2 "Ward's bread,"16 3 "an A-No. 1 fur coat," 164 "under-
wear,"16 5 "pork chops,"166 "salami, ' ' 167 or anything else,""' carries
16°Ward v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (1918) 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E.
225, 5 A. L. R. 242. Accord: Gussner v. Miller, (1920) 44 N. D. 487, 17(
N. W. 359 (hay in stack); Merriam v. Field, (1876) 39 Wis. 578 (log,
in raft) ; Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., (1915) 193 Ill. App. 620 (canned
fish); Young v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (W. D. Pa. 1936) 15 F. Supp.
1018 (jar of raspberry preserves) ; Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
(1930) 136 Misc. Rep. 468, 241 N. Y. S. 233, aff'd (1931) 232 App. Div.
822, 249 N. Y. S. 924 (can of tobacco) ; J. Aron & Co. v. Sills, (1925)
240 N. Y. 588, 148 N. E. 717 (condensed milk); Gimenez v. Great A. &
P. Tea Co., (1934) 264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27 (canned crab meat);
Botti v. Venice Grocery Co., (1941) 309 Mass. 450, 35 N. E. (2d) 491(macaroni) ; Ireland v. Louis K. Liggett Co., (1922) 243 Mass. 243, 137
N. E. 371 (face cream: fitness for use) ; Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co.,
(1940) 127 Conn. 44, 15 A. (2d) 181.
16lSee infra, note 210.
162Shepherd v. Pybus, (1842) 3 Man. & G. 868, 42 E. C. L. 452, 11
L. J. C. P. 101, 133 Eng. Rep. 1390.
163Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, (1931) 255 N. Y. 388, 175
N. E. 105, 74 A. L. R. 339; Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., (Cal. 1937)
67 P. (2d) 686 ("bread").
'
64Brandenberg v. Samuel Stores, (1931) 211 Iowa 1321, 235 N. W.
741, 77 A. L. R. 1161; Keenan v. Cherry & Webb, (1925) 47 R. I. 125,
131 Atl. 309 ("fur coat").
'('Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85, 105 L. J. P. C.
6, 154 L. T. 18, 52 T. L. R. 38.
16 6Hazelton v. First Nat. Stores, (1937) 88 N. H. 409, 190 Atl. 280;
Wiedeman v. Keller, (1898) 171 I1. 93, 49 N. E. 210 (meat); Rinaldi v.
Mohican Co., (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471 (loin of pork); Great
A. & P. Tea Co. v. Eiseman, (1935) 259 Ky. 103, 81 S. W. (2d) 900
(chicken).
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the understanding that the goods are what they appear to be, and
merchantable according to their appearance and the description
together. Since dealer sales are almost non-existent in which
words of description do not appear,16 it would seem that the
proper statement is not that the warranty cannot exist on specific
sales, but that when such sales are made by a dealer it is the normal
accompaniment.
There are of course cases17 0 in which a description is not
understood to be an essential term of the contract at all, but
merely a designation for convenience because the goods must be
called something, equivalent to "Lot No. 10;" and in such a case,
of course, no warranty even of genuineness according to descrip-
tion is to be implied. There are many decisions particularly in
the earlier American reports, which have said that merchantable
quality is not implied in sales of specific goods, or, what is evi-
dently intended to mean the same thing, in "executed" sales.17 '
But when these cases are examined, it will be found that they
involve either obvious defects in the face of inspection by the
buyer, 17  an implied disclaimer,17 ' or a limitation upon the liability
of dealers which has long since been repudiated by the Sales ActY.
7 4
" 67Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co., (1935) 4 Cal. (2d) 206, 47 P.
(2d) 708; Rabb v. Covington, (1939) 215 N. C. 572, 2 S. E. (2d) 705
("sausage").
"6Wren v. Holt, [1903] 1 K. B. 610, 72 L. J. K. B. 340, 88 L. T. 282
("Holden's Beer") ; Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, (1928) 2 K. B. 636, 97 L. J.
K. B. 812, 140 L. T. 21, 44 T. L. R. 737 ("Stone's ginger wine"); Naumann
v. Weble Brewing Co., (1940) 127 Conn. 44, 15 A. (2d) 181 (bottle of
ale) ; Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, (1936) 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N. E. (2d)
130 (cigar in cellophane wrapper) ; Swartz v. Edwards Motor Car Co.,
(1927) 49 R. I. 18, 139 Atl. 166 (automobile) ; Walters v. United Grocery
Co., (1918) 51 Utah 565, 172 Pac. 473, L. R. A. 1918E 519 (potato salad) ;
Larson v. Farmers Warehouse Co., (1931) 161 Wash. 640, 297 Pac. 653
(alfalfa) ; Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., (1916) 93 Wash. 118, 160 Pac.
14 (dried beef) ; Stewart v. Voll & Sons, (1911) 81 N. J. L. 323, 79 Atl.
1041 (potatoes); West Coast Lbr. Co. v. Wernicke, (1939) 137 Fla. 363,
188 So. 357 (seed).
'"'Even where the customer merely points to something on a counter
and says "Give me that," is not "that" a description? And does not the
dealer, merely by offering the goods for sale without a disclaimer, under-
take that "that" is what it appears to be, and a merchantable article of
the kind?
"1'Cf. St. Anthony & Dakota Elevator Co. v. Princeton Roller Mill
Co., (1908) 104 Minn. 401, 116 N. W. 935.
"7'Deming v. Foster, (1860) 42 N. H. 165; Fogel v. Brubaker, (1892)
122 Pa. St. 7, 15 Atl. 692; Kinsley v. Gruppe, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1917) 241
Fed. 466; Timken Carriage Co. v. Smith, (1904) 123 Iowa 554, 99 N. W.
183.
7 2 See infra, note 210.
1
7
3As in Gage v. Carpenter, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1901) 107 Fed. 886.
1'7See infra, note 180 ff.
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DEALERS
In England, merchantable quality was from the beginning a
dealer's warranty, arising even in the case of a dealer who was
not the manufacturer and never had seen the goods at the time of
sale." ' This was written into the English Sale of Goods Act,
and passed from it into the American act.'" It was recognized
quite early that the basis for the warranty did not exist in the
case of an individual sale by one not a dealer, since the buyer had no
reason to understand from the mere fact of sale that he was receiving
the kind of goods customarily sold on the market under the name,
where he bought from one who was not in the business.1 7 - The
statement often made that there is no implied warranty in the
sale of a second-hand article 17 obviously has reference to such
cases; and if a used car is sold by a dealer the buyer may expect
a warranty, not that it is a new car or as good as new, but that
it is still merchantable as a used one and reasonably fit to drive.7h
The American courts accepted the warranty readily enough
as to manufacturers dealing in their own products; but many of
them were surprisingly reluctant to acknowledge it in the case of
a dealer who was not the maker.'" 0 The reason for this seems to
175Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46; Jones v.
Just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B. 89.
176See supra, note 3, and text at note 1.
177Burnby v. Bollett, (1847) 16 M. & W. 644, 153 Eng. Rep. 1548;
Flood v. Senger, (1910) 140 App. Div. 140, 124 N. Y. S. 1013; Sockman
v. Keim, (1909) 19 N. D. 317, 124 N. W. 64. Cf. Turner v. Mucklow,
(1874) 6 T. L. R. (N. S.) 690; Jackson v. Harrison, (1862) 2 F. & F.
782; La Neuville v. Nourse, (1813) 3 Camp. 351, 170 Eng. Rep. 1407;
Blumberg v. Romer, (1938) 168 Misc. Rep. 169, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 352;
Zielinski v. Potter, (1917) 195 Mich. 90, 161 N. W. 851, L. R. A. 1917D
822; Wart v. Hoose, (1909) 65 Misc. Rep. 462, 119 N. Y. S. 1107.
17SJohnson v. Carden, (1914) 187 Ala. 142, 65 So. 813; Brierton v.
Anderson, (1929) 180 Ark. 12, 20 S. W. (2d) 313; Lamb v. Otto, (1921)
51 Cal. App. 433, 197 Pac. 147; Ramming v. Caldwell, (1891) 43 Ill. App.
175; Colchord Machinery Co. v. Loy-Wilson Foundry & Mach. Co., (1908)
131 Mo. App. 540, 110 S. V. 630; Jones v. Armstrong, (1915) 50 Mont.
168, 145 Pac. 949; Durbin v. Denham, (1922) 106 Or. 34, 210 Pac. 165, 29
A. L. R. 1227; Tibbets & Pleasant v. Town of Fairfax, (1930) 145 Okla.
211, 292 Pac. 9.1 79Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., (1915) 169 N. C. 41, 85
S. E. 35, L. R. A. 1915E 428 (second-hand hearse) ; Guyandotte Coal Co.
v. Virginian Elec. & Mach. Works, (1923) 94 W. Va. 300, 118 S. E. 512.
Accord, as to "fitness for the purpose": Bouchet v. Oregon Motor Car Co.,
(1915) 78 Or. 230, 152 Pac. 888; New Birdsall Co. v. Keys, (1903) 99
Mo. App. 458, 74 S. W. 12; Little Co. v. Fynboh, (1922) 120 Wash. 595,
207 Pac. 1064; Stracener v. Nunally Bros. Motor Co., (1929) 11 La. App.
541, 123 So. 911 (under Code); Crawford v. Abbott Automobile Co.,
(1924) 117 La. 59, 101 So. 871 (under Code) ; Dyer & Bros. v. Bauer,
(1921) 48 N. D. 396, 184 N. W. 809; E. Edelman & Co. v. Queen Stove
Works, (1939) 205 Minn. 7, 284 N. W. 838. It should be noted that the
Uniform Sales Act makes no exception as to second-hand goods.
1SOThompson v. Ashton, (1817) 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 316; Julian v.
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have been a certain confusion of the warranty of merchantable
quality with that of fitness for the buyer's "particular purpose."
The reliance upon the seller's skill or judgment necessary to the
latter was carried over into the former. It was considered that
both warranties must rest upon some assumed superior knowledge
of the seller concerning the qualities of the goods ;1s8 and since the
buyer must know that a dealer who was not the maker could have
no such knowledge, it was held that there could be no "reliance,"
and no warranty could be implied. Possibly the majority of the
American courts adopted this position prior to the passage of the
Uniform Sales Act. "- That statute, with its adoption of the
English rule, made an abrupt change in the law of these states,"8 3
imposing the warranty upon every dealer, "whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not."' ' There are today only a scant
handful of jurisdictions in which, without the Sales Act, the
common law does not recognize the dealer's warranty.'
Laubenberger, (1896) 16 Mlisc. 646, 38 N. Y. S. 1052; Chicago Packing
& Provision Co. v. Tilton, (1877) 87 Ind. 547; Ehrsam v. Brown, (1907)
76 Kan. 206, 91 Pac. 179, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 877; White v. Oakes,(1896) 88 Me. 267, 34 Atl. 175, 32 L. R. A. 592; Bigelow v. Mlaine Cen-
tral R. Co., (1912) 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396; West v. Emanuel, (1901) 198
Pa. St. 180, 47 Atl. 965; Hoyt v. Hainsworth Motor Co., (1920) 112
Wash. 440, 192 Pac. 918; Scruggins v. Jones, (1925) 207 Ky. 636, 269
S. W. 743.
Equally curious is the occasional holding that there is no warranty in
a sale to a dealer, because he buys only for resale, or is in an equal posi-
tion to judge. Cole v. Branch & O'Neal, (1926) 171 Ark. 611, 285 S. W.
353; Amos v. Walter N. Kelley Co., (1927) 240 Mich. 257, 215 N. W.
397; Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., (1907) 74 N. J. L. 274, 65 At. 883,
reversed on other grounds, (1908) 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 At. 314, 19 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 923.
I-See Hoe v. Sanborn, (1860) 21 N. Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163.
I-1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924), sec. 233.
'See for example Young v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (W.D. Pa. 1936)
15 F. Supp. 1018; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Eiseman, (1935) 259 Ky. 103,
81 S. W. (2d) 900; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, (1931) 255 N. Y.
388, 175 N. E. 105, 74 A. L. R. 339; Griffin v. James Butler Grocery Co.,(1931) 108 N. J. L. 92, 156 Ad. 636; Keenan v. Cherry & Webb, (1925)
47 R. I. 125, 131 AtI. 109; Larson v. Farmers Warehouse Co., .(1931) 161
Wash. 640, 297 Pac. 753.
'-'Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15 (2), 2 MAason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec.
8390 (2).
1-_Gcorgia, Mississippi and West Virginia are the only states found
that clearly cling to the old rule under the common law. Bel v. Adler,
(1940) 63 Ga. App. 473, 11 S. E. (2d) 495; Kroger Grocery Co. v.
Lewelling, (1933) 165 Mfiss. 71, 145 So. 726; Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel
Co., (1936) 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S. E. 610.
To the contrary, in common law states, may be listed: Walker v.
Great A. & P. Tea Co., (Tex. 1938) 112 S. W. (2d) 170; Degouveia v.
H. D. Lee Merc. Co., (Mfo. App. 1936) 100 S. W. (2d) 336; Colonna
v. Rosedale Dairy Co., (1936) 166 Va. 314, 186 S. E. 94: Swengel v. F.
& E. Wholesale Grocery Co., (1938) 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. (2d) 930; and
cf. West Coast Lbr. Co. v. Wernicke, (1939) 137 Fla. 363, 188 So. 357.
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Nevertheless, even under the Sales Act, there are a few
courts which continue to hold that the retailer does not warrant
that the goods he sells are fit for use.ls Their number is diminish-
ing rapidly.187 With few exceptions, 18 the cases have involved the
sale of goods in sealed containers, which the buyer must know that
the seller had not examined, and concerning the qualities of which
he could not reasonably be supposed to have any definite knowl-
edge. The argument has been that the buyer therefore does not
rely upon the "skill or judgment" of the seller, and hence that
there cannot be, under the Sales Act, a warranty of fitness for
the particular purpose. 189
Even on this basis, and on the assumption that the buyer is
aware that the seller does not know what is in the can, it is at
least arguable that reliance upon the seller's "skill or judgment,"
as distinct from his information, may be found. Certainly the
buyer is relying upon something when he buys; he cannot be
thought willing to buy a pig in a poke and accept the can with
whatever is in it, for better or for worse. Certainly he is not
relying upon any information of his own as to its contents. The
"reliance" required in a cause of action for any form of mis-
representation need not be sole reliance, or the only inducement to
act; it is enough that it plays a material part in the inducement.
The plaintiff may rely upon two or more elements making up the
sum total.1 0 This is true of warranties.191 When the buyer goes
'
8OBigelow v. Maine Central R. Co., (1912) 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396(not overruled since the Sales Act; see Pelletier v. Dupont, (1925) 124
Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Rowland, (1934) 17
Tenn. App. 433, 76 S. W. (2d) 65; Kirkland v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.,(1937) 233 Ala. 404, 171 So. 735; Harrington v. Montgomery Drug. Co.,
(Mont. 1941) 111 P. (2d) 808; Green v. Wilson, (1937) 194 Ark. 165,
105 S. W. (2d) 1074.
' 
7Recent decisions holding the dealer liable are: Dow Drug Co. v.
Nieman, (1936) 37 Ohio App. 190, 13 N. E. (2d) 130; Sicard v. Kremer,
(1938) 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N. E. (2d) 250; Gindraux v. Maurice Merc.
Co.,,(1935) 4 Cal. (2d) 206, 47 P. (2d) 708; and see cases cited supra,
note I83; infra, note 195.
1'8Particularly F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1934) 74 F. (2d) 439; Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (W.D. Wash.
1935) 12 F. Supp. 181.
18OWell stated in Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Mak-
ing, (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 494.
"g°Thus, where deceit is in question, the plaintiff may be found to have
relied upon what was told him by two liars, Addington v. Allen, (1833)
11 Wend. (N. Y.) 374; Strong v. Strong, (1886) 102 N. Y. 69, 5 N. E.
799; Safford v. Grout, (1876) 120 Mass. 20; Shaw v. Gilbert, (1901) 111
Wis. 165, 86 N. W. 188. Or he may rely in part on the defendant's state-
ment, in part on his own investigation. Schmidt v. Thompson, (1918) 140
Minn. 180, 167 N. W. 543; Tooker v. Alston, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1907) 159
Fed. 599, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818; Nichols v. Lane, (1919) 93 Vt. 87,
106 Atl. 592; Jones v. Elliott, (1920) 111 Wash. 138, 189 Pac. 1007;
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to a dealer, he knows that the man is in the business of selling
goods of the kind to be purchased; that he has selected the par-
ticular goods and is offering them to his trade for the uses for
which they are made; that he buys from manufacturers and
wholesalers and has information as to which of them are reliable;
and that he has had past experience with similar goods; and
usually with the particular brand. Is not this both "skill" and
"judg-nent" within the Sales Act? And is there not enough, in
the usual case, to permit a jury to find that reliance upon it has
played some important part in inducing the purchase? How
many women buy of one corner grocer rather than another, with-
out the belief that he is a competent grocer?
All this, however, appears to be beside the point. It is addressed
to the implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose. If
it be conceded that this is out of the case, there remains the
warranty of merchantable quality. From the beginning,'1 2 that
warranty has not required reliance upon any skill or judgment or
information of the seller. It has not rested upon misrepresentation,
with its tort theories, but upon contract. The question is one
of what the buyer has ordered and the seller has undertaken
to deliver. The seller's knowledge of the qualities of the goods is
not assumed; he may never have seen them. Any "reliance" that
may enter the warranty is reliance merely upon his undertaking,
and does not differ from the reliance to be found in any other
contract.
What, then, does the seller agree to deliver on a retail sale?
When the customer orders a can of beans, what is the meaning
of a "can of beans"? What does the buyer expect, and the seller
understand him to expect, to receive? Is it a can labeled "Beans"
but containing sauerkraut or fish? Or beans accompanied by
pebbles or ptomaines? Or something unidentified in a tin which
the seller hopes and believes, but does not undertake, to be beans
and fit to eat? Or is it a standard, merchantable can of beans,
of the kind customarily sold by such dealers, free from unusual
defects, and fit for human consumption? What customer would
buy on any other basis, any more than he would hire a mechanic
Smith v. Werkheiser, (1908) 152 Mich. 177, 115 N. W. 964, 15 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1092, 125 Am. St. Rep. 406.
"Medway Oil & Sw.orage Co. v. Silica Gel Corp., (1928) 33 Com.
Cas. 195; Cammell, Laird & Co. v. Manganese Bronze & Brass Co., [1934]
A. C. 402.
10'-Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46; Jones v.
Just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B. 89.
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to make him a machine ?193 Is there not at least enough, in the ordi-
nary case, to call for submission of these matters to a jury? Such
questions seem to carry their own reply.
The very interesting and valuable argument between Professor
Waite and Professor Brown194 has dealt at length with the ques-
tions of policy involved in the imposition of a warranty upon the
retail dealer. It is not the purpose of this article to add anything
to what has been said so well and so completely on both sides. All
that is contended is that the warranty is justified under the Sales
Act, which explicitly does not except the retailer, and says no
word of reliance on his skill or judgment, as to merchantable
quality. In fact the battle is nearly over. The overwhelming
majority of the courts now hold that the dealer warrants his goods
to be saleable and fit for ordinary use, even when they are sold
in sealed containers, 19 and of course all the more so when they
193"The principle is a familiar one, and enters in to the every day busi-
ness of men. If I engage a mechanic to manufacture an article in his line
of business, without any stipulation, the law implies the obligation to make
it in a skilful and workmanlike manner. So if I contract with a merchant
to furnish me with a quantity of wheat at a future day for a certain price
without any other stipulation, the law implies that it shall be of a good and
merchantable quality and condition. Common honesty is exacted of all, in
their dealings with one another, without any stipulation for it .... Under
such circumstances, it would be as absurd to permit a vendor to fulfil his
contract by delivering an article of the kind contracted for of no value, as
it would be to permit him to fulfil it by delivering an article of a totally
different kind, as oakum instead of cotton." Gallagher v. Waring, (1832)
9 Wend. (N. Y.) 20.
"Hood, the seller, could not on any other supposition than that the
cheese was merchantable have expected or believed that Bloch Bros. would
buy it." Hood v. Bloch, (1886) 29 W. Va. 244, 111 S. E. 910.
1 4Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, (1936) 34
Mich. L. Rev. 494; Robert C. Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for
Defective Food Products, (1939) 23 MENNEsoT LAw RwsEw 585; Waite,
Retail Responsibility-A Reply, (1939) 23 MINNESoTA LAW RIEmmv 612.
195jackson v. Watson & Sons, [1909] 2 K. B. 193, 78 L. J. K. B. 587,
100 L. T. 799, 25 T. L. R. 454; Gindraux v. Maurice Mere. Co., (1935)
4 Cal. (2d) 206, 47 P. (2d) 708; Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., (1932) 115
Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385, 90 A. L. R. 1260; Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
(1915) 193 Ill. App. 620; Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co.,
(1938) 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. (2d) 930 (wholesaler); Botti v. Venice
Grocery Co., (1941) 309 Mass. 450, 35 N. E. (2d) 491; Hertzler v. Man-
shum, (1924) 288 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155; Degouveia v. H. D. Lee
Merc. Co., (Mo. App. 1936) 100 S. W. (2d) 336; Griffin'v. James Butler
Co., (1931) 108 N. J. L. 72, 156 Atl. 636; Gimenez v. Great A. & P. Tea
Co., (1934) 264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27; Rabb v. Covington, (1939) 215
N. C. 572, 2 S. E. (2d) 705 (sausage in casing) ; Sicard v. Kremer, (1938)
133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N. E. (2d) 250; G. M. C. Truck Co. v. Kelley, (1924)
105 Okla. 84, 231 Pac. 882; Young v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (W.D. Pa.
1936) 15 F. Supp. 1018; Walker v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (Tex. 1938)
112 S. W. (2d) 170; Walters v. United Grocery Co., (1918) 51 Utah 565,
172 Pac. 473; Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., (1936) 166 Va. 314, 186
S. E. 94; Larson v. Farmers Warehouse Co., (1931) 161 Wash. 640, 297
Pac. 753; Cushing v. Rodman, (1936) 65 App. D. C. 258, 82 F. (2d) 864.
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are open to his examination. 1' Sometimes the warranty is stated
as one of merchantable quality, sometimes as one of "fitness for
the purpose ;" but since the purpose is the ordinary one for which
such goods are sold, and there is often little discussion of "reli-
ance," there is at least a strong suspicion that in all of the cases
merchantable quality is what is really meant. Sometimes there
is a statement of a deliberate policy in placing the loss upon the
seller; but more often the reason given is merely that goods fit for
use are what he has contracted to supply.
The controversy over the liability of restaurant keepers 19 7 has
turned upon a different point. There are still courts19 which
maintain that food eaten in a restaurant is not the subject of a
sale at all, but merely of a "service." This rather astonishing
notion is derived from the early days of innkeepers, 99 when the
guest paid a lump sum for lodging, meals and a stable for his
horse, and was permitted to eat his way from east to west across
a table spread before him until he gave out, but acquired title to
nothing he did not eat.200 In short, what is now mistakenly called
Cf. Hise v. Romeo Stores Co., (1921) 70 Colo. 249, 199 Pac. 483 (genuine-
ness) ; West Coast Lbr. Co. v. Wernicke, (1939) 137 Fla. 363, 188 So.
357 (genuineness).
'f' Wiedeman v. Keller, (1897) 171 Ill. 93, 49 N. E. 210; Rinaldi v.
Mohican Co., (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471; Hazelton v. First Nat.
Stores, (1937) 88 N. H. 409, 190 Atl. 280; Burgess v. Sanitary Meat
Market, (1939) 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S. E. (2d) 785; Keenan v. Cherry &
Webb, (1925) 47 R. I. 18, 139 Atl. 166; Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co.,
(1940) 127 Conn. 44, 15 A. (2d) 181 (exploding bottle); Great A. & P.
Tea Co. v. Eiseman, (1935) 259 Ky. 103, 81 S. W. (2d) 900.
'
7
.Sce Notes, (1936) 20 MlxxEsoTrA LAw REviEw 527; (1937) 10 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 188.
1'1McCarley v. Wood Drugs, (1934) 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446; Lynch
v. Hotel Bond Co., (1933) 117 Conn. 128, 167 AtI. 99; Rowe v. Louisville
& N. R. Co., (1922) 29 Ga. App. 151, 113 S. E. 823; Bigelow v. Maine
Central R. Co., (1912) 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 395, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627;
Childs Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, (1938) 173 Md. 490. 197 Atl. 105; Ken-
ney v. Wong Len, (1925) 81 N. H. 427, 128 Ati. 343; Nisky v. Childs
Co.. (1927) 103 N. J. L. 464, 135 Atl. 805, 50 A. L. R. 227; Valeri v.
Pullman Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1914) 218 Fed. 519; F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
Wilson, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 439 (the law in both New York
and Texas has subsequently changed) ; see Roseberry v. Wachter,. (1925)
33 Del. 253, 255, 138 Atl. 273; Prinsen v. Russos, (1927) 194 XWis. 142,
215 N. W 905.
'"'The early cases relied upon dealt with other questions, such as the
interpretation of insolvency laws. Crisp v. Pratt, (1639) Cro. Car. 549;
Newton v. Trigg. (1691) 3 'Mod. 327. 1 Show. 268, 1 Salk. 109, 3 Lev.
309, Comb. 181, Carth. 149; Parker v. Flint, (1699) 12 Mod. 254, Holt
K. B. 366 (quartering soldiers). From these cases Beale, Innkeepers (1906)
118, derived the statement that the innkeeper does not sell his food, but
"utters" it.
- -In Merrill v. Hodson, (1914) 88 Conn. 314, 91 AtI. 533, L. R. A.
1915B 481, Ann. Cas. 1916D 917, the court had great trouble with the idea
that title does not pass until the customer has eaten the food, and after that
there is nothing for him to own.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the American plan. It should be obvious that such a theory is
entirely unsuited to modern restaurants, with "orders" of definite
quantity served at fixed prices, where the understanding certainly
is that the guest owns the food and must pay for it from the
moment it reaches his table, and is free to wrap it up in a news-
paper and carry it away if he likes. Accordingly, a clear majority
of the courts now find a sale, and apply the warranties of the
Sales Act.20 1
Granted, however, that there is no sale, but only a "service,"
why should that negative the warranty? Implied warranties are
by no means limited to contracts for the sale of goods; they have
been found in bailments,2 0 2 shipments over a carrier, -2 0 3 and the
leasing of a furnished apartment. 211 If there is no sale, the ques.
tion remains, what kind of food does the buyer ask for and the
restaurant undertake to serve? On terms of simple contract,
there can be only one answer under any standards that the public
now demands: it is food of the kind commonly sold in restaurants,
and reasonably fit to eat-or in other words, food of merchantable
quality. 20 5
20 Lockett v. Charles, Ltd. [1938] 4 All Eng. Rep. 170, 159 L. T. 547,
55 T. L. R. 22; Cushing v. Rodman, (1936) 65 App. D. C. 258, 82 F. (2d)
864, 104 A. L. R. 1023 (a beautiful opinion, which seems to leave nothing
to be said) ; Lewis v. Roescher, (1936) 193 Ark. 161, 98 S. W. (2d) 956;
Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co., (1920) 213 Ill. App. 371, approved
in Brevoort Hotel Co. v. Ames, (1935) 360 Ill. 485, 196 N. E. 461;
Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., (1936) 6 Cal. (2d) 683, 59 P. (2d) 142:
Heise v. Gillette, (1925) 83 Ind. App. 551, 149 N. E. 182; Stanfield v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., (1936) 143 Kan. 117, 53 P. (2d) 878; Doyle
v Fuerst & Kraemer, (1911) 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.)
480, Ann. Cas. 1913B 1100; Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., (1918) 231
Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407, 5 A. L. R. 1100; Bark v. Dixson, (1911) 115
Minn. 172, 131 N. W. 1078, Ann. Cas. 1912D 775 (a weak case); Bell v.
S. S. Kresge Co., (Mo. App. 1932) 129 S. W. (2d) 932; Temple v. Keeler,
(1924) 238 N. Y. 44, 144 N. E. 635, 35 A. L. R. 920; Williams v. Elson.
(1940) 218 N. C. 157, 10 S. E. (2d) 668 (food taken out) ; Yochem v.
Gloria, (1938) 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N. E. (2d) 731; Koplin v. Louis K.
Liggett Co., (1935) 119 Pa. Super. 375, 181 Atl. 381; Ford v. Waldorf
System, (1936) 57 R. I. 131, 188 Atl. 633; S. H. Kress & Co. v. Ferguson,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 60 S. W. (2d) 817; Kenower v. Hotels Statler Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1942) 124 F. (2d) 658.
2O2Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, (1923) 237 N. Y. 30, 142 N. E.
342, 31 A. L. R. 536; Hartford Battery Sales Corp. v. Price, (1935) 119
Pa. Super. 165, 181 AUt. 95; Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Dickelman Mfg.
Co., (1921) 15 Ohio App. 270; Hilton v. Vagner, (1928) 10 Tenn. App.
173; Matter of Casualty Co. of America, (1929) 250 N. Y. 410, 165 N. E.
829; Geddling v. Marsh, [1920] 1 K. B. 688, 46 L. J. K. B. 259. See (1933)
17 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 10.20 Bamfield v. Goole & Sheffield Transport Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 94, 79
L. J. K. B. 1070.20Ingalls v. Hobbs, (1892) 156 Mass. 348, 31 N. E. 286, 16 L. R. A.
51, 32 Am. St. Rep. 460; Morgenthau v. Ehrich, (1912) 77 Misc. Rep. 139,
136 N. Y. S. 140.205See Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., (1936) 143 Kan. 117, 53 P
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The conclusion is, then, that this warranty may exist in any
sale made by the dealer in which a description of the goods sold
is, in the understanding of the parties, an essential term of the
contract. The warranty is not narrow, but broad: it is a standard
dealers' warranty, requiring that all goods marketed shall be of
merchantable quality, unless it is understood that the buyer is to
accept those which are not.
INSPECTION
Among the circumstances which may prevent or limit the
implied warranty of merchantable quality, the buyer's inspection
of the particular goods before the contract 208 is perhaps the most
important. Even where there is an express warranty of quality,
if the buyer has examined the goods and their defects are dis-
covered, or so obvious that he could avoid discovery only by
shutting his eyes to what was evident, -0 7 the warranty is in-
effective. The reason is that he must understand that the seller is
offering for sale what is before him, as it appears to be; and even
express language, at least in any form other than an explicit
reference to the defect itself,208 will not entitle him to expect any-
thing different. This rule is of course carried over all the more
readily into warranties which are merely implied. As to all
known l"r or obvious 210 deficiencies in goods which the buyer has
(2d) 878, 882; Cushing v. Rodman, (1936) 65 App. D. C. 258, 82 F. (2d)
864, 104 A. L. R. 1023; 4 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 2748;
Notes, (1936) 20 MINNEsOTA LAW REvIEw 527; (1937) 10 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 188; Void, Sales (1931), 477.20 01nspection after the contract and before passage of title will not
affect the warranty. In such a case, under section 49 of the Uniform Sales
Act, 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8423, the buyer may accept the
goods with knowledge of their defects and maintain an action against the
seller for breach of warranty, provided that he gives notice of the breach
within a reasonable time after he knows or ought to know of it.
""r7Otherwise if the defect could only be discovered by careful and
expert examination. 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924), 399, 401; W. T.
Adams Mach. Co. v. Turner, (1909) 162 Ala. 351, 50 So. 308.
"
5Thus the seller may expressly warrant against the extent or conse-
quences of even known defects. Fitzgerald v. Evans, (1892) 49 Minn. 541,
52 N. W. 143; Norris v. Parker, (1896) 15 Tex. Civ. App. 117, 38 S. NV.
259; Watson v. Roode, (1890) 30 Neb. 264, 271, 46 N. V. 491, aff'd (1893)
43 Neb. 348, 61 N. W. 625.
"')0 Wavra v. Karr, (1919) 142 Minn. 248, 172 N. X1V. 118; Anderson
v. Van Doren, (1919) 142 Minn. 237, 172 N. W. 117; Brooks v. Camak,
(1908) 130 Ga. 213, 60 S. E. 456.
"Rosenbush v. Learned, (1922) 242 Mlass. 297, 136 N. E. 341; Colitz
& Co. v. Davis, (1936) 177 Okla. 607, 62 P. (2d) 67; American Waste Co.
v. St. Mary, (1924) 210 App. Div. 383, 206 N. Y. S. 316; Lowry Coffee
Co. v. Andresen-Ryan Co., (1922) 153 Minn. 498, 190 N. W. 985; Carleton
v. Jenks, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1897) 80 Fed. 937; Colchord Machinery Co. v.
Loy-Wilson Foundry & Mach. Co., (1908) 131 Mo. App. 540, 110 S. W.
630.
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inspected, no description on the part of the seller and no standards
common to the market can override his "I offer you what you
see ;" and when the buyer accepts that offer, he agrees to buy
the goods according to the appearance they present. The Uni-
form Sales Act211 contains a provision to that effect.
Latent defects, 212 however, are another matter. The offer to
sell "what you see" cannot charge the buyer with acceptance of
what is not visible; and the question becomes one of whether the
understanding that goods of merchantable quality are to be sold
is destroyed merely by the fact that the buyer has inspected at all.
In reason, much should depend upon the circumstances under
which the inspection is made. It is quite possible that the seller
may say to the buyer, in effect, "Here are goods; look them over,
take them or leave them; you are to buy on your own judgment,
and I undertake nothing except to sell you these specific goods."
In other words, an implied disclaimer of warranty.2 13 If this is the
understanding, it necessarily follows that there can be no implica-
tion of any warranty, whether of merchantable quality or of
fitness for the particular purpose.2 14 It makes no difference whether
the buyer inspects thoroughly, or casually and partially,215 or that
inspection is difficult or inconvenient,"" or even that he decides to
take his chances and not to inspect at all.
217
It does not follow, however, that the offer of an opportunity to
inspect always carries such a disclaimer. It is entirely possible that
2llSec. 15 (3), 2 'ason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8390 (3): "If the
buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as regards
defects which such examination ought to have revealed."212 ee Note, (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 941. "The difference
between patent and latent is that one is open to observation by ordinary
inspection and the other is not." Miller & Co. v. Moore, Sims & Co., (1889)
84 Ga. 684, 692, 10 S. E. 360, 6 L. R. A. 374, 20 Am. St. Rep. 329.
2 3This was certainly the case in Barnard v. Kellogg, (1870) 10 Vall.
(U. S.) 383, 19 L. Ed. 987, often cited as the leading case on inspection.
The seller refused to sell unless the buyer first inspected for himself.214Barnard v. Kellogg, (1870) 10 Wall. (U. S.) 383, 19 L. Ed. 987;
Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., (1908) 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 481,
15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884, 15 Ann. Cas. 1076, 126 Am. St. Rep. 436 (chicken
on bargain counter).215Barnard v. Kellogg, (1870) 10 Wall. (U. S.) 383, 19 L. Ed. 987;
Thornett & Fehr v. Beers & Son, [1919] 1 K. B. 486. 88 L. J. K. B. 684,
120 L. T. 570.
-16Cudahy Packing Co. v. Narzisenfeld, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1924) 3 F.
(2d) 567; Byrne v. Jansen, (1875) 50 Cal. 624; Hyatt v. Boyle, (1833)
5 Gill & J. (Md. 110, 25 Am. Dec. 276; Hyde Construction Co. v. Steven-
son, (1937) 181 Okla. 8, 72 P. (2d) 354.
217Moore v. McKinlay & Garrioch, (1855) 5 Cal. 471; Byrne v. Jansen,
(1875) 50 Cal. 624; Lamb v. Otto, (1921) 51 Cal. App. 433, 197 Pac. 147;
Alexander v. Stone, (1916) 29 Cal. App. 488. 156 Pac. 998; Weber Iron
& Steel Co. v. Wright, (1932) 14 Tenn. App. 451.
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the seller may say, in effect, "Here are merchantable goods, of
the kind and quality sold on the market; if you have doubts, you
are free to examine them ;" and after examination the buyer may
say, in return, "They look all right; I will take them for what
they appear to be, but for the rest I will rely upon your under-
taking as to quality." Under such conditions, the warranty may
of course still be implied, even where the buyer has made the
fullest examination open to him, 21s and certainly all the more
readily where his inspection is only a hasty or partial one,219 or
where he declines the opportunity and does not inspect at all.22 0
It cannot be said that the one type of transaction is more
likely than the other in any dealer sale; and which one is involved
in the particular case is a matter of the probable understanding
of the parties in the light of their conversation and the circum-
stances, which is a question of fact, frequently to be decided by the
jury. Before the Sales Act there were many cases 22 1 which seemed
to say, as a matter of law, that no warranty could be implied
where the buyer had had full opportunity to inspect the goods.
21*Gilpatrick v. Downie, (1927) 143 Wash. 671, 255 Pac. 1028, 52
A. L. R. 1533; Rocky Mountain Seed Co. v. Knorr, (1933) 92 Colo. 320,
20 P. (2d) 304; West Coast Lumber Co. v. Wernicke, (1939) 137 Fla.
363, 188 So. 357; Flynn v. Bedell Co., (1922) 242 Mass. 450, 136 N. E.
252, 27 A. L. R. 1504; Keenan v. Cherry & Webb, (1925) 47 R. I. 125, 131
At. 309; Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471;
John Service, Inc., v. Goodnow-Pearson Co., (1922) 242 Mass. 594, 136
N. E. 623; South Brooklyn Paper & Rag Co. v. Marquart, (1920) 180
N. Y. S. 28; Stroock & Co. v. Lichtenthal, (1928) 224 App. Div. 19, 229
N. Y. S. 371; Hise v. Romeo Stores Co., (1921) 70 Colo. 249, 199 Pac.
483; Brandenberg v. Samuel Stores, (1931) 211 Iowa 1321, 235 N. W.
741, 77 A. L. R. 1161; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Eiseman, (1935) 259
Ky. 103, 81 S. W. (2d) 900; Rabb v. Covington, (1939) 215 N. C. 572,
2 S. E. (2d) 705.
-- iKellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, (1884) 110 U. S. 108, 3 Sup. Ct.
537, 28 L. Ed. 86; Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing
Corp., (1937) 93 Utah 414, 73 P. (2d) 1272; Swartz v. Edwards Mrfotor
Car Co., (1927) 49 R. 1. 18, 139 At. 466; Stewart v. Voll & Sons, (1911)
AI N. J. L. 323, 79 AtI. 1041.
22"This seems obviously to follow from the holdings as to partial
inspection, supra, note 219; and see 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) ; Vold,
Sales (1931), 455, note 45; Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and
Society: II, (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 341, 382.
2"llBarnard v. Kellogg, (1870) 10 Vall. (U.S.) 383. 19 L. Ed. 987;
Ketchum v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., (1903) 33 Wash. 92, 73 Pac. 1127;
Woods v. Nicholas & Parker, (1914) 92 Kan. 258, 140 Pac. 862; Martin
& Co. v. Roehm, (1900) 92 Il1. App. 87; Dorsey v. Watkins, (C.C. Mo.
1907) 151 Fed. 340; McQuaid v. Ross, (1893) 85 Wis. 492, 55 N. W. 705,
22 L. R. A. 187, 39 Am. St. Rep. 864; Carleton v. Jenks, (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1897) 80 Fed. 937; Dunn v. Vaughan, (1926) 120 Okla. 240, 251 Pac. 472;
Dishman v. Griffis, (1918) 16 Ala. 381, 77 So. 961; Browning v. McNear,
(1904) 145 Cal. 272, 178 Pac. 722; Becker v. Brewner, (1885) 18 Ill.
App. 39; Hight v. Bacon, (1878) 126 Mass. 10, 30 Am. Rep. 639; White
v. Oakes, (1896) 88 Me. 367, 34 Atl. 175, 32 L. R. A. 592.
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Concerning these cases it is to be said, either that the buyer
had been told in effect that he must rely solely upon his own
examination, or that in looking to the "reliance upon the seller's
skill or judgment" necessary to a warranty of fitness for the
particular purpose the courts assumed that where the buyer re-
lied on his own judgment to any extent at all he could not also
rely upon the seller's. This last is certainly not true, since as to
latent defects is is well settled that the buyer may rely both upon
his own inspection and upon the seller's undertaking expressed
in the contract. 22 2 Since the passage of the Sales Act, the emphasis
has been shifted to the actual understanding of the parties, with
the result that there has been a strong tendency 22 to find a war-
ranty as to latent defects even in the face of inspection. This
has proved to be all the more necessary as goods have become
more highly specialized, marketing processes more complex, and
buyers more helpless to form any intelligent estimate of the char-
acter of the goods on the basis of their own examination or tests.
The statute,22 4 declaring that inspection negatives the warranty
as to defects which it ought to have revealed, is silent as to
latent ones. The inference is sufficiently evident, and the con-
clusion would appear to be that in a dealer's sale merchantable
quality is warranted unless the inspection, or offer of an oppor-
tunity to inspect, amounts under the circumstances to a disclaimer.
This is borne out by the law regarding sales by sample. A
sample, of course, involves both a description ("goods like this")
and an inspection. If there are obvious defects in the sample when
the buyer inspects it, he has of course no right to demand that
the goods shall be merchantable when the sample is not..2 2 5 Even
if there are latent defects, if he is told in effect that he must
examine the sample for himself and buy on his own judgment,
there is still no warranty to be implied.226 But if the sample is
222Keely v. Turbeville, (1883) 11 Lea (Tenn.) 339; cf. Morrow v.
Bonebrake, (1911) 84 Kan. 724, 115 Pac. 585, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147;
Brown v. Andrews, (1911) 116 Minn. 150, 133 N. W. 568; Bogert, Express
Warranties in Sales of Goods, (1923) 33 Yale L. J. 14, 29.2 23See cases cited supra, notes 218, 219.
22
4See supra, note 211.225Mody v. Gregson, (1868) L. R. 4 Ex. 49, 38 L. J. Ex. 12, 19 L. T.
458; Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Puckett, (1904) 139 Ala. 331, 35 So. 1019;
Worcester Mfg. Co. v. Waterbury Brass Co., (1901) 73 Conn. 554, 48 Atl.
422; Chicago House Wrecking Co. v. Durand, (1902) 105 Ill. App. 175;
Dorman v. Thorpe, (1933) 217 Iowa 91, 250 N. W. 902; Remy, Schmidt
& Pleissner v. Healy, (1910) 161 Mich. 266, 126 N. W. 202.
226Dunbar Bros. Co. v. Consolidated Iron-Steel Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2d
Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 416; Navarette v. Travis-Ziegler Co., (1922) 194
N. Y. S. 832; L. A. Lockwood, Jr. v. E. Gross. & Co., (1923) 99 Conn.
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accompanied by a description, a term of the contract designating
what is to be sold, it has been well established since 1854227 that
it is not enough that the goods delivered correspond to the sample
with its latent deficiencies. They must also correspond with the
description, and if the seller is a dealer they must be of merchant-
able quality according to the description. 22s The seller's under-
taking is then not merely to deliver goods "like this ;" it is to de-
liver goods such as the sample appears and is described to be;
and on the part of a dealer that means merchantable goods. As
there is no reason to believe that the Sales Act - 2 intends to dis-
tinguish between inspection of a sample and any other inspection,
the conclusion stated above would seem to follow.
DIsCLAIMERS
A disclaimer is a refusal of the seller to warrant. Since war-
ranty is a matter subject to contract, it was held at common law,23
and is recognized by the Uniform Sales Act,2 1 that the parties
are entirely free to make their own agreement, and to dispense
206, 122 Atl. 59. Cf. People v. Western Picture Frame Co., (1938) 368 Ill.
331, 13 N. E. (2d) 958 (partial inspection).
22Nichols v. Godts, (1854) 10 Exch. 191, 2 C. L. R. 1468, 23 L. J.
Ex. 314.2 Mody v. Gregson, (1868) L. R. 4 Ex. 49, 38 L. 3. Ex. 12, 19 L. T.
458; James Drummond & Sons v. E. H. Van Ingen & Co., (1887) 12 App.
Cas. 284, 56 L. J. Q. B. 563, 3 T. L. R. 541; Laggett v. Young, (1888) 29
N. B. 675; Laganas Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Sharood, (1928) 173 Minn. 535, 217
N. W. 941 ; Gould v. Stein, (1889) 149 Mass. 570, 22 N. E. 47, 5 L. R. A.
213, 14 Am. St. Rep. 455; Steering Wheel Co. v. Fae Elecric Car Co.,
(1913) 174 Mich. 512, 140 N. W. 1016; Ungerer & Co. v. Louis Maul]
Cheese & Fish Co., (1911) 155 Mo. App. 95, 134 S. W. 56; Stewart v. Voll
& Son, (1911) 81 N. J. L. 323, 79 Atl. 1041; Nixa Canning Co., (1905)
70 Kan. 664, 79 Pac. 141, 70 L. R. A. 653; Bierman v. City Mills Co.,
(1897) 151 N. Y. 482, 45 N. E. 856, 37 L. R. A. 799, 56 Am. St. Rep. 636;
Greenwood Cotton Mills v. Tolbert, (1916) 105 S. C. 273, 89 S. E. 653.22oSection 16, 2 Mason's 1927 finn. Stats., sec. 8391: "In the case of
a contract to sell or a sale by sample: . . . (c) If the seller is a dealer in
goods of that kind, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be free
from any defect rendering them unmercbantable which would not be appar-
ent on reasonable examination of the sample."
2'"Baglehole v. Walters, (1811) 3 Camp. 154, 170 Eng. Rep. 1338;
Shepherd v. Kain, (1821) 5 B. & Ald. 240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180; Dowagiac
Mfg. Co. v. Mahon & Robinson, (1904) 13 N. D. 516, 101 N. W. 903; J. I.
Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. McClamrock, (1910) 152 N. C. 405, 67 S. E.991.
-.3lSection 71, 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8445: "Where any
right, duty or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by
implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or
by the course of dealings between the parties, or by custom, if the custom
be such as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale."
As to disclaimers under the Sales Act, see the exhaustive discussion in
Note, (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 784; also Note, (1921) 21 Col.
L. Rev. 1325.
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with a warranty that would otherwise exist. If when he enters
into the contract to purchase the buyer understands that the seller
is not willing to undertake responsibility for the character or
quality of the goods, he cannot claim that there is any warranty
obligation. Such a disclaimer may be, and usually is, expressed in
words ;212 but it may be implied from the conduct of the parties, or
the circumstances of the sale. In either case, it must be fairly
brought home to the buyer before the contract is concluded ;23
and there are cases holding, on ordinary contract principles, that
a disclaimer in fine print,2 34 or in an obscure place, 235 which the
buyer excusably does not read, will not avoid liability.
An express disclaimer may be a total one, denying all respon-
sibility, and requiring the buyer to accept goods delivered without
recourse against the seller. Such, for example, is an agreement
that the buyer is to take the goods "as i8,''236 or "with all faults,
defects or errors, -2 37 or a provision, varying according to the
fancy or ingenuity of the seller's draftsman, that he does not
warrant them in any respect whatsoever.2 38 Where, as has fre-
232A common form of disclaimer is that found in Minneapolis Thresh-
ing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, (1926) 54 N. D. 559, 209 N. W. 996: "There
are no representations, agreements, obligations or conditions, express or
implied, statutory or otherwise, relating to the subject matter hereof, other
than herein contained; and ... this agreement is the sole contract and com-
prises all agreements between the parties hereto with reference to said
machinery."
233Thus a disclaimer on an invoice sent with the goods after the con-
tract is made is ineffective. Ward v. Valker, (1920) 44 N. D. 598, 176
N. W. 129; Edgar v. Breck & Sons Corp., (1899) 172 Mass. 581, 52 N. E.
1083; Amzi Godden Seed Co. v. Smith, (1913) 185 Ala. 296, 64 So. 100;
see Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., (1917) 139 Minn. 117, 165 N. W.
484, L. R. A. 1918C 391, Ann. Cas. 1918E 481; Longino v. Thompson,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 209 S. W. 202, 205.234Woodworth v. Rice Bros. Co., (1920) 110 Misc. Rep. 158, 179 N. Y.
S. 722, aff'd (1920) 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N. Y. S. 958; cf. Federal Motor
Truck Sales Corp. v. Shanus, (1933) 190 'Minn. 5, 10, 250 N. W. 713.2 3 5Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., (1930) 158 S. C. 112, 155 S. E.
268 (disclaimer in sale of seed, in seller's catalogue, on its invoices, and
on cards in seed bags) ; Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, (1939) 169
Misc. Rep. 879, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 110 (on back of invoice). In Angerosa
v. White & Co., (1936) 248 App. Div. 425, 290 N. Y. S. 204, aff'd (1937)
275 N. Y. 524, 11 N. E. (2d) 325, the court, in its anxiety to avoid the
effect of the disclaimer, carried this principle to an extreme that seems
unjustifiable.23 6Held effective in Alexander v. Sola, (1921) 185 N. Y. S. 869;
Union Trust Co. v. Detroit River Transit Co., (1910) 162 Mich. 670, 127
N. W. 780; R. E. Brooks Co. v. Storr. (1933) 111 N. J. L. 316, 168 At.
382; Kimball-Clark Co. v. Crosby, (1921) 175 Wis. 337, 185 N. W. 172.23 7Held effective in Taylor v. Bullen, (1850) 5 Exch. 779, 20 L. J. Ex.
21, 16 L. T. 0. S. 154, 155 Eng. Rep. 341, even though the ship was not
"teak-built" as described.23
8Held effective in Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking,
(1926) 54 N. D. 559, 209 N. W. 996 (see supra, note 232) ; Burntisland
Shipbuilding Co. v. Barde Steel Products Corp., (D. Del. 1922) 278 Fed.
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quently been the case, such disclaimers are held completely effec-
tive,'-"' a dangerous power is placed in the hands of the seller.
Taken literally, the language used would permit him to deliver
anything he likes, supplying scrap iron to a buyer who expects
to receive onions, or worthless junk instead of an article for
which a fair price has been paid, and yet escape all liability.
There are, as a matter of fact, some sales in which even this
would not be an unreasonable agreement, as where goods are sold
at auction 2 ' or they are understood to be off-grade 4 ' or second-
hand,2 "' 2 or they are at a distance and the seller makes it clear that
he knows nothing about them ;243 or where, by reason of the
nature of the goods and the business, the seller cannot know what
he is delivering, and makes it clear that he is willing to sell
only upon the condition that the buyer will hold him to no respon-
sibility.2 4 I' A disclaimer is not at all a pernicious thing in any case
where it appears that the buyer really is willing to take his chances.
In the usual dealer sale, however, it cannot reasonably be
thought that the buyer is willing to pay good money for whatever
the seller will give him, and remain completely at the seller's
mercy. While he is notified that the thing delivered may have its
faults and defects, he at least understands that it is an article of
the kind described in the contract, and that what purports to be
glassware is not in reality pickled fish or toy balloons. The seller
could not reasonably suppose that he would buy upon any other
552 ("Quantity, quality or description not guaranteed"); Morgan v. Wil-
liams, (1933) 46 Ga. App. 774, 169 S. E. 211; Kolodzcak v. Peerless Motor
Co., (1931) 255 Mich. 47, 237 N. W. 41; and see cases cited infra, notes
240-244, 268-270.239See cases cited supra, notes 236-238; infra, notes 240-244, 268-270.
2lOHirsh v. Duval Co., (1906) 101 N. Y. S. 35 ("examine before buy-
ing, description on package not guaranteed; goods sold as they are at time
of sale") ; United States v. Atlantic Wrecking Co., (N.D. Ga. 1925) 8 F.
(2d) 542; Seligman v. Underwriters' Salvage Co., (1916) 158 N. Y. S. 874.24'Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Clifton Mills, (1933) 310 Pa. St. 322,
165 At]. 385.
242'Rogers v. Hale, (1928) 205 Iowa 557, 218 N. W. 264; W. F.
Dollen & Sons v. Carl R. Miller Tractor Co., (1932) 214 Iowa 774, 241
N. W. 307; J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. McClamrock, (1910) 152
N. C. 405, 67 S. E. 991.
2-Gage v. Carpenter, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1901) 107 Fed. 886. Cf. Pottash
v. Herman Reach & Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 658 (war-time
contract).
2"ILumbrazo v. Woodruff, (1931) 256 N. Y. 92, 175 N. E. 525, 75
A. L. R. 1017 (seed); Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., (1932) 79 Utah 12,
7 P. (2d) 270 (seed) ; Ross v. Northrup King & Co., (1914) 156 Wis. 327.
144 N. W. 124 (seed). The custom of the seed trade that the seller does
not warrant has played a considerable part in these decisions.
Even in cases such as those cited in notes 240-244, it seems clear that
the seller will not be free to substitute other goods for specific goods sold.
Ward v. Valker, (1920) 44 N. D. 598, 176 N. W. 129.
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basis. Any general language of the disclaimer, no matter how
comprehensive it may be, is contradicted to some extent in such a
case by the description of the goods to be sold. Accordingly, the
courts, wherever possible, and particularly where the disclaimer is
drawn by the seller and the buyer merely adheres to it,21c have con-
strued the description and the disclaimer together, and have held
that the goods are at least warranted genuine according to the de-
scription. A "copper fastened vessel, to be taken with all faults 2 '
means only those faults consistent with a copper fastened vessel as
the term is understood in the trade; "foreign refined rape oil, war-
ranted only equal to samples" 24 7 must be foreign refined rape oil,
of the commercial kind, even though the samples are not; "sweet
clover seed"2 48 must not be alfalfa, and "grapes '241 must not be
sawdust. From this it is a short step to construe the description as
calling for goods of the kind sold on the market, merchantable
under the description, and to hold that a disclaimer in general
terms does not exclude the minimum warranty of merchantable
quality. Courts eager to protect the buyer against the disclaimer,
and to give him what they believe he really had in mind, have
adopted this construction.
250
245Following the principle that the language of an agreement is to be
interpreted most strongly against the party using it. 3 Williston, Contracts(Rev. ed. 1936), 1788; Restatement of Contracts, sec. 236 (d) ; Hansmann
v. Pollard, (1911) 113 Minn. 429, 129 N. W. 848.246Shepherd v. Kain, (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180.
247Nichols v. Godts, (1854) 10 Exch. 191, 2 C. L. R. 1468, 23 L. J.
Ex. 314.
-48Smith v. Oscar H. Will & Co., (1924) 51 N. D. 357, 199 N. W. 861.
Accord: Ward v. Valker, (1920) 44 N. D. 598, 176 N. W. 129 (wrong
kind of seed) ; Williams v. McClain, (1937) 180 Miss. 6, 176 So. 717(1933 model Ford hearse "as is") ; Downey v. Price Chemical Co., (1924)
204 Ky. 98, 263 S. W. 690 ("No warranty of any kind" does not exclude
kind and character) ; Robert A. Munro & Co. v. Meyer, [1930] 2 K. B. 312.
99 L. J. K. B. 703 ("with all faults and defects" does not exclude cor-
respondence with the description, an "overriding warranty") ; see Rock-
wood & Co. v. Parrott & Co., (1933) 142 Or. 261, 19 P. (2d) 423 ("No
warranties of any kind" does not exclude genuineness).
249Lewitus v. Independent Fruit Auction Corp., (1926) 128 Misc. Rep.
384, 219 N. Y. S. 5.
-5°Main v. Dearing, (1905) 73 Ark. 470, 84 S. W. 640; Main v. El
Dorado Dry Goods Co., (1907) 83 Ark. 15, 102 S. W. 681; Meyer v.
Packard Cleveland Motor Co., (1922) 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N. E. 118("waiver" of all agreements not specified does not exclude the "essence of
the contract," fitness for use as a truck) ; United Fig & Date Co. v.
Falkenberg, (1934) 176 Wash. 122, 28 P. (2d) 287 ("Rejection by buyer.
if accepted by seller, constitutes delivery" does not apply where unmer-
chantable goods tendered, since not called for by the contract), Hall
Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., (1915) 169 N. C. 41, 85 S. E. 35 (dis-
claimer as to "condition" does not exclude warranty that it can at least
be used as a hearse).
Merchantable quality seems to be implicit in the "genuineness"
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Undoubtedly a clever draftsman can go far toward avoiding
such a result. But the courts have been no less adroit in discover-
ing loopholes. The English courts, in the past,25 1 *set up a highly
artificial distinction between a warranty and a "condition," and
proceeded to hold that where the difference between the goods
contracted for and those delivered was so great that it could be
considered one of kind rather than of degree,25 2 there was a
breach of a "condition" of the contract, to which a disclaimer of
warranties could have no application. Even after the distinction
was obliterated in part by statute,23 they have continued to apply
it,2, and there are even decisions reaching such remarkable con-
clusions as that a defective tractor is not a tractor,2 " and that a
sterile bull is not a bull at all.25 8 The distinction, which in the
first instance does not commend itself to common sense, is at
least partially destroyed by the provision of the American Sales
Act2 7 permitting the buyer to treat any condition which the seller
has promised to perform as a warranty; but it might perhaps still
be available where goods of the wrong kind are delivered, since
the Act says that the buyer "may treat," and not that he must.22 8
demanded in many of the cases cited above, particularly Shepherd v. Kain,
(1821) 5 B. & Ald. 240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180; Nichols v. Godts, (1854) 10
Exch. 191, 2 C. L. R. 1468, 23 L. J. Ex. 314; Downey v. Price Chemical
Co., (1924) 204 Ky. 98, 263 S. W. 690 ("commercial kind or character").
2
'See Benjamin, Sale of Personal Property (7th ed. 1931) 634, 686.
252Stated in Harrison v. Knowles & Foster, [1917] 2 K. B. 606, 610,
by Bailhache, J.
2
-The English rule exposed the buyer to the alternative of breaking
his contract by non-acceptance if it should be held that there was a breach
of warranty, or waiving the breach by acceptance if it turned out to be a
condition. The second possibility was taken care of by 56 & 57 Victoria,
ch. 71, sec. 11 (a), providing that the buyer may elect to treat a breach of
condition as a breach of warranty.
2 S4Wallis Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes, [1910] 2 K. B. 1003, 79
L. J. K. B. 1013, 103 L. T. 118, 26 T. L. R. 572. See the discussion of the
further development of the British Empire law in (1938) 7 Fortnightly
L. J. 280; (1936) 1 Res. Judicatae 146.
2: 5Massey-Harris Co. v. Skelding, [1934] 3 Dom. L. Rep. 193, 1934
S. C. Rep. 431.
Cotter v. Luckie, [1918] N. Z. L. Rep. 811.
- Section 11 (1), 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8386 (1): "Where
the obligation of either party to a contract to sell or a sale is subject to
any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse t6 proceed
with the contract or sale or he may waive performance of the condition.
If the other party has promised that the condition should happen or be
performed, such first mentioned party may also treat the non-performance
of the condition as a breach of warranty."2
"The language of the American section does not differ essentially
from that of the English statute construed in Wallis Son & Wells v. Pratt
& Haynes, [1910] 2 K. B. 1003, 79 L. J. K. B. 1013, 103 L. T. 118, 26
T. L. R. 572, where the distinction was preserved.
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The few decisions which have considered the question have held.
however, that the distinction no longer exists. 25 15
Some half-dozen American courts have accomplished much the
same result by holding that there is not merely a breach
of warranty, but a "breach of contract" 200 or a "failure of con-
sideration" 261 when the seller delivers goods of the wrong kind.
This seems to be something of a subterfuge, since unless the
goods delivered are entirely without value 262 either breach of con-
tract or failure of consideration can consist only in the fact that
they are not what was contracted for, or in other words not as
warranted.
A third piece of judicial ingenuity has been to construe the
disclaimer as applicable to express warranties only. 263 Thus a
provision that "No warranties have been made . . . by the seller
to the buyer unless expressly written hereon" was held by the
Minnesota court26 4 to have no reference to warranties which were
implied, since the latter were not "made" by the parties, but
imposed by the law-a clear adoption of the third theory of the
nature of implied warranties referred to above.2 15 The justification
for the evasion, if such it be, must lie in the rule that the dis-
claimer is to be construed heavily against the seller who drew it.
There are similar decisions in other jurisdictions.26  Obviously,
however, any tyro of a draftsman can still provide that no war-
259 Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, (1931) 256 N. Y. 92, 175 N. E. 525, 75
A. L. R. 1017, reversing (1930) 229 App. Div. 407, 242 N. Y. S. 335;
Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., (1932) 79 Utah 12, 7 P. (2d) 270; Crandall
Engineering Co. v. Winslow Marine Ry. & Ship Building Co., (1936) 188
Wash. 1, 61 P. (2d) 136, 106 A. L. R. 1357.
2-OInternational Harvester Co. of America v. Bean, (1914) 159 Ky.
842, 169 S. W. 549; Rocky Mountain Seed Co. v. Knorr, (1933) 92 Colo.
320, 20 P. (2d) 304; Smith v. Oscar H. Will & Co., (1924) 51 N. D. 357,
199 N. W. 861 (under Sales Act, but no mention of it).
261Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, (1926) 192 N. C. 330, 135 S. E. 141;
Lewitus v. Independent Fruit Auction Co., (1926) 128 Misc. Rep. 384, 219
N. Y. S. 5; see Laitner Plumbing & Heating Co. v. McThomas, (Mo. App.
1933) 61 S. W. (2d) 270, 271.26 2Thus in L. D. Powell Co. v. Sturgeon, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 299
S. W. 274, it was held that there was no failure of consideration where the
goods delivered had at least junk value.26 3By way of comparison, the disclaimer in Andrews Bros. v. Singer
& Co., [1934] 1 K. B. 17, 103 L. J. K. B. 90, 150 L. T. 172, 50 T. L. R.
33, was construed to exclude implied warranties only, and conformity with
the description was held to be a matter of express warranty.
264Bekkevold v. Potts, (1927) 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. Vr . 790, 59 A. L. R.
1164.2 65See supra, text at note 39.2 66Hooven & Allison Co. v. Wirtz Bros., (1906) 15 N. D. 477, 107
N. W. 1078; Main v. Dearing, (1905) 73 Ark. 470, 84 S. W. 640; Hardy
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., (1928) 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S. E.
327; Little v. G. E. Van Syckle & Co., (1898) 115 Mich. 480, 73 N. W.
554; National Equipment Co. v. Moore, (1933) 189 Minn. 632, 250 N. V.
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ranties are to be implied .267 Other courts have rejected the open-
ing, and have given such clauses as "We give no warranties, 28 6
or "No warranties have been made,"'2 6, or "There are no under-
standings or agreements relative to the contract other than those
expressed herein"'2 7 the meaning obviously intended.
An express disclaimer may be partial, excluding only war-
ranties against certain defects, or all warranties except one ex-
pressly given.271 More commonly, partial disclaimers take the
form of a limitation of the buyer's remedies in case of breach.
It may be provided, for example, that his only remedy shall be
repair or replacement by the seller,27 2 or rescission ;273 or certain
conditions may be attached to any remedy, such as discovery of
the defects 74 or notice to the seller 27 5 within a specified time. If
677; Lutz v. Hill-Diesel Engine Co., (1931) 255 Mich. 98, 237 N. W. 546;
Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Rodziewicz, (1937) 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 Atl. 586;
Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, (1931) 161 S. C. 40, 159 S. E. 461; Corley
v. Wilensky & Son, (1937) 55 Ga. App. 857, 191 S. E. 879; Hughes v.
National Equipment Corp., (1935) 216 Iowa 1000, 250 N. W. 154. Cf. J. A.
Campbell Co. v. Corley, (1932) 140 Or. 462, 13 P. (2d) 610, 14 P. (2d)
455 ("No verbal warranties valid").
"67Thus, after the North Dakota decision cited in note 263, it was held
in Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, (1926) 54 N. D. 559, 209
N. W. 996, that a disclaimer of all warranties "express or implied" was
effective.26SLarson v. Inland Seed Co., (1927) 143 Wash. 557, 255 Pac. 919, 62
A. L. R. 444; Kibbe v. Voodruff, (1920) 94 Conn. 443, 109 AtI. 169;
Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Co., (1911) 147 Wis. 166, 132 N. W.
902, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79, Ann. Cas. 1912D 1077; Landreth Seed Co. v.
Kerlec Seed Co., (1930) 12 La. App. 506, 126 So. 460.
130Getzoff v. Von Lengerke Buick Co., (1936) 14 N. J. Misc. 750,
187 At]. 539; see Oldfield v. International Motor Co., (1921) 138 Md. 35,
45, 113 Atl. 632.
270S. F. Bowser & Co. v. Independent Dye House, (1931) 276 Mass.
289, 177 N. E. 268; Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & Coke
Co., (1929) 334 Ill. 281, 165 N. E. 793; Heller v. Franklin-Butler Motors,(1930) 259 Ill. App. 358; McCabe v. Standard Motor Construction Co.,
(1929) 106 N. J. L. 227, 147 At. 466; Vandiver v. B. B. Wilson & Co.,
(1932) 244 Ky. 601, 51 S. W. (2d) 899.
-
71Thus Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon & Robinson, (1904) 13 N. D.
516, 101 N. W. 903 (warranted "only against breakage").
-72Sharpless Separator Co. v. Domestic Electric Refrigerator Corp.,
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 499; Lee v. Pauly Motor Truck Co.,(1922) 179 Wash. 139, 190 N. W. 819; Long v. Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co.,
(1926) 120 Okla. 63, 250 Pac. 504.
-73Helvetia Copper Co. v. Hart-Parr Co., (1919) 142 Minn. 74, 171
N. W. 272, 767; Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Wharton, (1930) 211
Iowa 264, 233 N. W. 673, 77 A. L. R. 1153; Holden v. Advance-Rumely
Thresher Co., (1931) 61 N. D. 584, 239 N. W. 479.
274Dayton Oakland Co. v. Livesay, (1929) 34 Ohio App. 302, 170 N. E.
880 (ninety days).
-
7
-'Marshall Milling Co. v. Hintz-Cameron Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 301,
194 N. W. 772 (thirty days) ; Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co. v. Neely,
(1934) 50 Ga. App. 231, 177 S. E. 606 (five days) ; J. I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co. v. Rose, (1921) 191 Ky. 433, 230 S. W. 545 (notice to seller
after six days and opportunity to repair; if not repaired, return to seller).
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the language used is not mandatory, such provisions often are
construed as merely permissive ;276 but if it is clear that a limitation
is intended, it is given effect.27 7 Here again, however, the courts
occasionally have gone to some pains to assist the buyer, holding
that the - limitation does not apply because the seller has de-
livered the wrong goods and so has not performed his contract
at all,27 or that he has "waived" conditions as to time by making
efforts to repair the goods, and so encouraging the buyer to
keep them..
2 79
It may be gathered that the courts have looked with rather
a jaundiced eye upon disclaimers; and certainly this coincides
with the public view of them.2 80 One lower New York court "
has declared that they will not be tolerated in the retail sale of
food, because the public health is involved, and "it is against
natural justice and good morals to permit an individual or corpora-
tion to manufacture food containing dangerous foreign substances
and to escape the consequences of his acts by a disclaimer." In
North Dakota, the struggle between the farmer demanding some-
thing fit to use for his money and the maker of agricultural imple-
ments seeking to eliminate the buyer who purchases just before
harvest and blithely returns the goods with a claim of defects
immediately his crop is in, has culminated in a statute 82 declaring
276Mandel v. Buttles, (1875) 21 Minn. 391; Ebbert v. Philadelphia
Electric Co., (1937) 126 Pa. Super. 351, 191 Atl. 384; cf. Remington Arms
U. M. C. Co. v. Gaynor Mfg. Co., (1923) 98 Conn. 721, 120 Ati. 572.
277Pottash v. Herman Reach & Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed.
658 (allowance for defects) ; Black Motor Co. v. Foure, (1936) 275 Mich.
607, 276 N. W. 748; Clark Implement Co. v. Priebe, (1928) 52 S. D. 606,
219 N. W. 475. Even in the absence of an express declaration, the remedy
has been found to be intended to be exclusive. Long v. Ideal Elec. & Mfg.
Co., (1926) 120 Okla. 63. 250 Pac. 504; Morris & Co. v. Power Mfg. Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 689; Graves Ice Cream Co. v. Rudolph
W. Wurlitzer Co., (1937) 267 Ky. 1, 100 S. W. (2d) 819.
27SAustin Co. v. Tillman Co., (1922) 104 Or. 541, 209 Pac. 131, 30
A.L.R. 293.
279Detwiler v. Downes, (1912) 119 Minn. 44, 137 N. W. 422, 50 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 753; Williams v. Bullock Tractor Co., (1921) 186 Cal. 32,
198 Pac. 780; Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co. v. Parent, (1932)
93 Mont. 207, 17 P. (2d) 1088. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Cullum, (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 1 (ineffective replacements).
280See Bogert and Fink, Business Practices Regarding Warranties in
the Sale of Goods, (1931) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400.
282Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, (1939) 169 Misc. Rep. 879,
9 N. Y. S. (2d) 110. Cf. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Frey, (1910)
127 La. 183, 186, 53 So. 486.282N. D. Com. Laws, 1913 Supp., secs. 5991a, 5993a. Held constitu-
tional in Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., (1931) 61 N. D. 452,
238 N. W. 552, 78 A. L. R. 1338; Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jack-
son, (1932) 287 U. S. 283, 53 Sup. Ct. 133, 77 L. Ed. 306, 87 A. L. R. 285.
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that the buyer may rescind if the implement is not reasonably fit
for the purpose, and that any contractual provision to the contrary
is void as against public policy. Doubtless we shall see more of
such legislation. The current draft of the proposed Revised
Uniform Sales Act283 provides that the implied warranties shall
not be negatived or modified by any general disclaimer "if the
circumstances indicate that a reasonable person in the position
of the buyer would, despite such general language, be in fact
relying on the merchantable quality of the goods or their fitness
for a particular purpose." This seems to be an excellent statement
of a desirable rule.
Implied disclaimers arise where the buyer is given to under-
stand, by the conduct of the seller or the circumstances surround-
ing the sale, that he is not receiving a warranty. One obvious
illustration is a notice given him by the seller tfiat the goods are
defective; if he buys thereafter, he cannot be heard to say that he
understood the contrary.2 84 As has been seen, an offer of the
opportunity to inspect the goods, made in such a manner as to
notify the buyer that he must rely solely upon his own judgment,
may amount to the same thing. The custom of a particular trade
not to warrant,28M or to limit the buyer's remedy for any breach in a
particular manner, 280 has been held to carry an implied disclaimer
into the contract; and this has the sanction of the Uniform Sales
Act.'' s Undoubtedly the same may be true of any past course
of dealing between the parties.28 8 There are cases in which the
character of the goods themselves precludes any idea that they are
to be of merchantable quality, as where they consist of a waste
product from the seller's plant, known to be uncertain and variable
2s2Second Draft (1941), sec. 15 (6).
28
'Anderson v. Van Doren, (1919) 142 Minn. 237, 172 N. W. 117.
2851Blizzard Bros. v. Growers' Canning Co., (1911) 152 Iowa 257, 132
N. W. 66; Miller v. Germain Seed & Plant Co., (1924) 193 Cal. 62, 222
Pac. 817, 32 A. L. R. 1215 (custom binding even if unknown to the buyer,
if it is of general and universal application); De Stefano v. Associated
Fruit Co., (1925) 318 Ill. 345, 149 N. E. 284; cf. Hoover v. Utah Nursery
Co., (1932) 79 Utah 12, 7 P. (2d) 270; Ross v. Northrup King & Co.,
(1914) 156 Wis. 327, 144 N. W. 1124.
2S6Agoos Kid Co. v. Blumenthal Import Corp., (1933) 282 Mass. 1,
184 N. E. 279; see Herbrand Co. v. Lackawanna Steel Co., (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1922) 280 Fed. 11.
2.8 Section 71, 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8445. See supra, note
231.
'Section 71, Uniform Sales Act; 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec.
8445; Matthes v. Benn, (1919) 107 Misc. Rep. 633, 176 N. Y. S. 770; cf.
Moore v. American Molasses Co., (1919) 106 Misc. Rep. 263, 174 N. Y. S.
440.
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and sold for what it will bring.2 9 By the same token, of course,
any second-hand article cannot be supposed to be as good as
new. 290 Likewise any new and untried invention understood to be
still in the experimental stage,29' or machine constructed specially
* according to the buyer's specifications, 29 2 cannot be expected to be
of any standard marketable quality.
Before the passage of the Uniform Sales Act, it was held in
some jurisdictions22 that the statement of an express warranty in
the contract necessarily disclaimed by implication the existence of
any other warranties that might be implied. Occasionally this was
put upon the basis of the parol evidence rule, but more often it
was said that the expression of one warranty must be intended by
the parties to exclude all others not expressed. Where any incon-
sistency is to be found between the express warranty and what
is to be implied, this conclusion is of course sound ;294 but even in
the absence of the Sales Act it has been recognized that where
there is no such inconsistency the fact that the parties have chosen
to declare one warranty of special importance does not mean that
they have abandoned others which would not normally be expressed
at all.2 -9 The act 29 6 has provided that an express warranty does
not exclude an implied one unless the two are inconsistent. Under
-89Listman Mill Co. v. Miller, (1907) 131 Wis. 393, 111 N. W. 496
(mill screenings) ; Holden v. Clancy, (1871) 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 590 ("slops
from their distillery"). Cf. Best Mercantile Co. v. Brewer, (1875) 50 Cal.
455, 115 Pac. 726 (no warranty "May eggs" sold in December are fresh).
290 Morley v. Consolidated Mfg. Co., (1907) 196 Mass. 257, 81 N. E.
993. There may still, however, be a warranty that the goods are merchant-
able as second-hand goods. See 'supra, note 179.
29
'Thielman v. Reinsch, (1912) 103 Ark. 307, 146 S. W. 525.292Curwen v. Quill, (1896) 165 Mass. 373, 43 N. E. 203. Cf. Dunbar
Bros. v. Consolidated Iron-Steel Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1928) 23 F.
(2d) 416.
293Slinger v. Totten, (1917) 38 S. D. 249, 160 N. W. 1008, L. R. A.
1917C 839; Reeves & Co. v. Byers, (1900) 155 Ind. 535, 58 N. E. 713;
Ford Motor Co. v. Switzer, (1924) 140 Va. 383, 394, 125 S. E. 209; De
Witt v. Berry, (1890) 134 U. S. 306, 10 Sup. Ct. 536, 33 L. Ed. 896.
294Thus in Thomas v. Thomas, (1906) 146 Ala. 533, 41 So. 141; Hall
v. Duplex-Power Co., (1912) 168 Mich. 643, 135 N. W. 118; Gaar, Scott
& Co. v. Hodges, (Ky. 1906) 90 S. W. 580.
29ZJ. B. Colt Co. v. Gavin, (1927) 33 N. M. 169, 262 Pac. 529; Smith
v. Russ Mfg. Co., (1932) 167 S. C. 464, 166 S. E. 607; Illinois Zinc Co.
v. Semple, (1927) 123 Kan. 368, 255 Pac. 78; Loxtercamp v. Lininger
Implement Co., (1910) 147 Iowa 29, 125 N. W. 830; Boulware v. Victor
Automobile Mfg. Co., (1911) 152 Mo. App. 567, 134 S. W. 7; J. I. Case
Plow Works v. Niles & S. Co., (1895) 90 Wis. 590, 63 N. W. 1013.296Sec. 15 (6), 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 8390 (6): "An
express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition
implied under this act unless inconsistent therewith."
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this provision, an inconsistency has sometimes been found,297 but
more frequently it is held that the two warranties are not neces-
sarily contradictory, and that the one does not exclude the other. 98
CONCLUSION
From the simple proposition, first announced by Lord Ellen-
borough in 1815, that a dealer who contracts to sell goods of a
particular description is understood to agree that he will deliver
what is commonly sold in the market under that description, the
courts have developed the implied warranty of merchantable
quality. It has grown, by degrees, to include not only genuineness
according to the description and saleability in the market, but
also fitness for the ordinary uses and purposes for which such goods
are made and sold, and freedom from all defects which will inter-
fere with sale or use. The time may yet come when it will be
extended to include a grade or quality not totally inconsistent
with the price. It has grown to include all dealers, even the re-
tailer and the restaurant keeper, and to cover specific goods which
are in the presence of the buyer and under his inspection when
he agrees to buy. On all three fronts, although there are decisions
which still lag behind, the battle is now virtually won for the
buyer. The warranty includes all dealer sales in which the buyer
is given to understand that he is to receive goods of a particular
description, which means all but a negligible few. In short, it
has become a standard dealer's warranty, presumed to exist, in
practice and effect if not technically in law, in every sale made
by one who deals in goods of the kind and description required
by the contract, and defeated only by words or circumstances
amounting to an express or implied disclaimer.
2 7Lee v. Cobrt, (1930) 57 S. D. 387, 232 N. W. 900; Tucker v. Tray-
lor Engineering Co., (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 783. In Bekkevold
v. Potts, (1927) 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790, 59 A. L. R. 1164, it was
said that if the express warranty is inconsistent with only part of the mat-
ters covered by the implied warranty, the buyer may avail himself of what
is not inconsistent.
2sKitowski v. Thompson Yards, Inc., (1921) 150 Mfinn. 436, 185 N. W.
504; Petersen v. Dreher, (1923) 196 Iowa 178, 194 N. W. 53; Flynn v.
Bedell Co., (1922) 242 Mass. 450, 136 N. E. 252, 27 A. L. R. 1504; Klinge
v. Farris, (1929) 128 Or. 142, 273 Pac 854, 268 Pac. 748; Burkett v.
Oilomatic Heating Corp. (1928) 241 Mich. 634, 217 N. W. 897; Wise v.
Central Iowa Motors Co., (1929) 207 Iowa 939, 233 N. W. 862; Day Pul-
verizer Co. v. Rutledge, (1931) 238 Ky. 817, 38 S. W. (2d) 949; J. B.
Colt Co. v. Asher, (1931) 239 Ky. 235, 39 S. W. (2d) 263. See Mechem,
Implied and Oral Warranties and the Parol Evidence Rule, (1928) 12
MiNNEsorA LAw Rlvmw 209.
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The implied warranty of merchantable quality is the most
powerful weapon at the buyer's command. It has lain under the
double shadow of the ancient tort origin of warranty, with its
emphasis upon misrepresentation of a fact which the seller pur-
ports to know, and of the companion warranty of fitness for the
particular purpose. Both have led many courts, in the past, to
insist upon some reliance upon the seller's skill, or judgment, or
supposed information. The warranty of merchantable quality
does not rest, and from the beginning did not rest, upon any such
basis. It is a matter of contract, of interpretation of the language
used in the light of the fact that the seller is a dealer, and dealers
deal in merchantable goods. The only "reliance" which it involves is
reliance upon the seller's undertaking, as it is reasonably under-
stood by the buyer. The pleasant sound of "fitness for the pur-
pose" should not be allowed to divert attention from one warranty
to the other, or to obscure the fact that goods are merchantable
only if they are fit for ordinary use. The implied warranty of
merchantable quality is in fact the more important of the two.
The recognition of the warranty in such terms in the Revised
Uniform Sales Act 219 is merely a restatement of what the courts
have done.
29OSee supra, note 8.
